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1. INTRODUCTION
Nation-building cannot succeed unless political trustees' give
greater priority to economic development. In the political
trusteeships of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
private sector economic development has taken a backseat to
humanitarian relief, human rights work, and the establishment of
political institutions. Part of the problem may be the immaturity of
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1 The term "political trusteeship" refers to the administration of a territory by
one or more foreign states for the benefit of the population of the territory, aimed
at eventual autonomy, self-government, and economic sufficiency. Recent
examples are the U.N.-approved trusteeships in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures of Political Trusteeship, 8
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. (forthcoming 2004) [hereinafter Perritt, Structures
of Political Trusteeship] (describing the history of political trusteeship, arguing that
political trustees cannot be successful unless they enjoy international and internal
legitimacy, and offering prescriptions for success).
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development theory. Some scholars emphasize capital formation
as the crucial component needed to accelerate development
through universal stages; others emphasize human capital
formation; structuralists emphasize country-specific analysis of
institutional impediments to development; 2 and neoclassicists
emphasize the need for the government to stay out of the way.3
But political trusteeships are not academic exercises, and
development theory actually has played only a dim background
role in recent initiatives. More often, inattention to economic
development has resulted from the reality that human rights
violations or international security threats usually justify the
intervention, and that senior personnel recruited to run political
trusteeships are more oriented by background and expertise to
human rights or diplomacy than to private sector entrepreneurship
and capital formation. Administrators of political trusteeships do
not have textbooks on development by Walt Rostow or Gale
Johnson behind their desks; instead they have copies of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Geneva
Conventions, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the
Helsinki Accords.
The political trusteeship in Kosovo provides an interesting case
study from which lessons can be learned about how to place
private sector economic development higher on the list of trustee
priorities. The mandate of the political trustee in Kosovo was
especially robust, including virtually very aspect of sovereignty.
The local culture and experience, while problematic, was
hospitable to market-oriented economic interaction. Accordingly,
a close examination of the missteps in Kosovo can inform future
political trusteeships so that the international community does a
more effective job in promoting economic opportunities for trust
beneficiaries.
2 See Dani Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth: What They Are and How
to Acquire Them, 35 STUD. IN COMP. INT'L DEV. 3, 27-28 (2000) [hereinafter Rodrik,
Institutions for High-Quality Growth] (discussing the types of institutions that
permit markets to perform effectively and the importance of experimenting and
considering each country's experience); see also DANIEL KAUFMANN ET AL.,
GOVERNANCE MATTERS (1999) (discussing the impact of good governance on
development outcomes), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/
governance/pdf/govmatrs.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
3 See The History of Economic Thought Website, Economic Development
(commenting on the evolution of the theory of economic development), at
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/develop.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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For administrators who are interested in promoting economic
development, the immediate practical challenges are not ones of
selecting the right theory of economic development. Rather, they
involve construing the trustee's mandate broadly enough to make
the legal and institutional changes necessary for enterprise
formation and capital investment; designing and erecting a
hospitable legal infrastructure for private enterprise; establishing
necessary financial service intermediaries; and assisting local
entrepreneurs to promote products, services, and investment
opportunities. Successfully meeting these challenges requires
pragmatic legal and business acumen rather than theoretical
creativity.
Familiarity with competing models for company law, payment
systems, commercial dispute resolution, and property law
transformation is more important to the operational
decisionmaking of political trustees than is deep knowledge of
theories of constitutionalism. Knowing how microcredit and
investment promotion for small and medium enterprises ("SMEs")
has worked in other countries in transition is more important than
understanding the latest data on total factor productivity in the
developing world.
Five years of political trusteeship by the international
community in Kosovo has produced insufficient economic
progress. The unemployment rate remains close to 60%; no overall
vision for economic self-sufficiency exists; privatization has barely
begun; and few steps have been taken to exploit the potential of
entrepreneurial energy to start new SMEs.
Uncertainty about the final status of Kosovo is partly
responsible for the slow start. U.N. lawyers questioned the legal
authority to restructure inefficient enterprises, and Kosovo's lack
of independent identity discourages outside investors. The U.N.
Mission in Kosovo ("UNMIK") arbitrarily denies contact between
Kosovar governmental representatives and the rest of the world.
The European Union ("EU") Stability Pact mostly leaves Kosovo
out of regional economic development activities. Kosovar political
leaders are distracted from the important job of developing
concrete programs for developing the private economy.4 In other
4 A January 2003 survey by the United Nations Development Programme
("U.N.D.P.") of 6,000 Kosovars showed widely varying satisfaction and
confidence in municipal government, ranging from positive views in Suhareki
and Gjilan, to negative views in Zveqan and Malishev!. The U.N. Development
2004]
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respects, uncertainty about final status is merely an excuse for
public entities to not do their jobs. Among other problems, there is
a lack of transparency. Neither UNMIK nor the Provisional
Institutions of Self Government ("PISG") promptly and reliably
publishes their legislative acts.
The United States should begin the process of convening an
international conference to decide the final status of Kosovo.
UNMIK and provisional governmental institutions must meet their
responsibilities to reform law and public administration to create a
better investment climate. UNMIK must also establish important
financial services intermediation to make it easier for
entrepreneurs and investors to get together and make deals.
Successfully finishing the job in Kosovo is an important step in
the achievement of the goals of political trusteeships elsewhere,
such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. Withdrawing from Kosovo or
perpetuating an increasingly illegitimate U.N. trusteeship there
would likely lead to chaos, the collapse of physical security,
renewed inter-ethnic conflict, and threats to security elsewhere in
the western Balkans. Such a failure in a major international
commitment would encourage those who believe that the
campaign against terrorism cannot be won because the West lacks
the discipline to persevere and to define achievable goals.
Kosovo's population is overwhelmingly Muslim and
overwhelmingly loves America. Abandoning the prospects for a
stable, democratic, prosperous secular state in Kosovo would raise
doubts about the U.S. capacity to interact successfully with less
hospitable Muslim populations elsewhere in the world.
On the other hand, staying the course in Kosovo, refocusing
attention on economic development, providing leadership to other
elements of the international mission there, and eventually
achieving an independent state with appropriate political,
economic, and security ties to the rest of the region will yield
valuable lessons that can inform other nation-building efforts.
Ambiguity in the mandate for the political trusteeship in
Kosovo led to roadblocks to early initiatives for economic
restructuring. The elements of a sustainable private economy that
still need attention in Kosovo are the same in any nation-building
enterprise. Preoccupation with privatization, at the expense of
attention to agricultural reform and to SME formation, is a mistake
Programme, The Kosovo Mosaic: Perceptions of Local Government and Public Services
in Kosovo, at 10 fig. 1 (2003), at http://undg.ks.undp.org/mosaic.htm.
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that can be avoided elsewhere. Shortfalls in private sector-oriented
economic expertise and tools hamstrung the early Kosovo
trusteeship; it should not impede similar efforts in the future.
2. BACKGROUND
The political trusteeship 5 in Kosovo exists under the mandate
of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244, which followed military
intervention in Kosovo by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
("NATO") in 1999. Tensions between Albanians, the majority
ethnic group, and Serbs, the minority ethnic group, in the territory
of Kosovo predated the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. As the
Ottoman Empire eroded in the late nineteenth century, emergent
Serbia, initially as an autonomous principality within the Ottoman
Empire, and then as an independent state, began to press
Albanians to leave the territory of modem-day Kosovo.6 In 1878,
Albanian nationalists assembled at the League of Prizren to
develop a strategy to defend Muslim and Albanian traditions
against encroachment. The League took over the administration of
Kosovo for about a year, but in 1881 the Albanian "insurrection"
was crushed by Turkish troops.
7
By the time of the first Balkan war in 1912, Serbia was an
independent state and sent its troops into Kosovo, consolidating
Serbian rule and thereby preventing the unification of the Albanian
population in Kosovo with the new state of Albania, recognized in
1913.8
In 1915, the Austro-Hungarians, Germans, and Bulgarians
expelled the Serbs from Kosovo and occupied Serbia. But in 1918,
Serbs reoccupied Kosovo and on December 1, 1918, a new
Yugoslav state called the "Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and
5 "Political trustee" refers to situations in which one or more states, acting on
their own, or under approval by the U.N. Security Council, administer the
territory of another state. Political trusteeship is distinguished from conquest, in
which successful military intervention is usually followed by the annexation of
conquered territory into the conquering state. In contrast, political trusteeship
legitimizes intervention and foreign administration only for the benefit of the
peoples of the territory administered. Political trusteeships are inevitably
followed by a return to local political control. See Perritt, Structures of Political
Trusteeship, supra note 1.
6 See TIM JUDAH, Kosovo: WAR AND REVENGE 11-12 (2000) (discussing the
background to the war in Kosovo).
7 Id. at 12.
8 Id. at 18.
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Slovenes," was established.
Kosovar Albanians resisted incorporation of Kosovo into the
emerging Yugoslavia. "It was, after all, a state of the south Slavs,
as it[s] name suggested, and the Albanians are not Slavs."9 Briefly,
during the post-World War I Paris peace conference, Kosovar
Albanians were encouraged to believe that a unified Albanian state
would emerge from the wreckage of the now defunct Ottoman
Empire. 10 Eventually, however, not only was Kosovo made part of
what became Yugoslavia, but only with President Woodrow
Wilson's intervention did Albania avoid its own breakup and
partition.
Albanian resistance to the Serb government continued at
various levels of intensity during the interwar period. When
World War II broke out, Italy occupied Albania and eventually
extended its military control throughout Kosovo and Albanian
areas of Macedonia. Tito, the new ruler of Yugoslavia, sought to
attract Albanian support for his "partisan" movement by
promising autonomy to Kosovar Albanians. However, after the
end of World War II, attracting Serbian support was more
important to Tito and Albanian national aspirations had to be
deferred once again. Only in 1974, with the adoption of a new
constitution for Yugoslavia, were Kosovar Albanians granted
formal autonomy as an "autonomous province" within Serbia. The
legal status of autonomous province was equivalent to the
"republic" status given Slovenes, Croats, Montenegrins, and
Macedonians except that an autonomous province had no power
to secede from Yugoslavia. Under the 1974 constitution, Kosovar
Albanian aspirations intensified as Albanians were allowed to set
up Albanian-language institutions, such as the University of
Prishtina.
Historically, investment in Yugoslavia was politically
motivated. Kosovo was a grim place in the 1960s; the only way to
survive was agriculture. Consequently, anyone who could
emigrate did so, and the Serbs were concerned that this would
deplete the Serb population.
Later, 80% of all Yugoslav investment in underdeveloped parts
of Yugoslavia was in Kosovo. Most of it went to the Trepca mines.
9 Id. at 21.
10 See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PARIS 1919: SIX MONTHS THAT CHANGED THE
WORLD 358-63 (2001) (describing the power struggle over Albania following the
Great War).
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Kosovo was a supplier to socially owned enterprises ("SOEs")
11
elsewhere in Yugoslavia with an emphasis on colored metals.
Money flowed, as the Yugoslav government thought it necessary
to prevent unrest. This process started in 1974. Infrastructure was
only built to support SOEs. A good example is Rahovec, where an
SOE with supporting infrastructure was built to prevent a Serb
exodus.
Susan Woodward has developed a persuasive case that the
collapse of Yugoslavia was occasioned as much by an economic
implosion as by a leadership succession crisis after Tito's death,
and far more by economic hardship and immature political
institutions than by "ancient ethnic hatreds." 12 As the Cold War
ended, international institutions such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund ("IMF") lost interest in Yugoslavia.
Unemployment in all of Yugoslavia grew from just under 14% in
1979 to nearly 17% in 1988, and from just under 40% in Kosovo to
nearly 60% during the same period. Gross domestic product
("GDP") growth declined from a positive 5% in 1979 to a negative
10% in 1990.13
The University of Prishtina, established in 1974, was meant to
reduce Albanian unrest, but it made problems worse. It led to the
creation of an Albanian bourgeoisie, which strengthened Albanian
nationalism. As Yugoslavia began to fall apart after the death of
Tito and the end of the Cold War, Serb Communist leader
Slobodan Milosevic discovered that he could accelerate his political
rise by currying favor with minority Serbs within Kosovo.
14
Milosevic changed the Yugoslav Constitution to revoke Albanian
autonomy.' 5  This decision was followed by an "Albanian
declaration of independence" in September 1991 and the erection
of a parallel political, legal, and economic structure, beginning in
11 A socially owned enterprise ("SOE") is a unique type of economic
organization implemented by Tito in Yugoslavia. It shifts ownership of
productive assets from the state to groups of employees making up an individual
enterprise and to the municipalities where they live. Sorting out property
interests associated with the SOE concept is daunting. See generally Abdulla Aliu,
The Law on Ownership Rights in Kosova, 1 EURO-ATLANTIC REV. 49 (2002).
12 SUSAN L. WOODWARD, BALKAN TRAGEDY: CHAOS AND DISSOLUTION AFTER THE
COLD WAR 15-17 (1995) (discussing the history of the conflict in the Balkans).
13 Id. at 52-55.
14 See Louis SELL, SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA
39-64 (2002) (describing Milosevic's rise to power).
15 See id. at 93 (detailing how the Serb Assembly dissolved its Kosovo
counterpart and declared all of its laws invalid).
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1992.16
By the mid-1990s, when the Dayton Accords ended the Bosnian
War, it was clear that the campaign of passive resistance organized
by Ibrahim Rugova, the leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo
("LDK"), was not working-or in any event that it would not
attract sufficient international intervention to make an independent
Kosovo a reality. Gradually, ar-med resistance to Serb control
developed among Kosovar Albanians, crystallizing into the
Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA") in early 1998. After 1989, the
Kosovar Albanians were removed from management positions in
the SOEs, but they became middlemen in a hyperinflationary
Yugoslavia. The fact that the Albanians became rich made them a
target of the Financial Police in 1998 and 1999. As Albanian unrest
increased, so did Serb repression, which had the effect of
improving KLA recruitment.17
By mid-1998, NATO began to threaten military intervention
unless Milosevic ceased his efforts to drive Kosovar Albanians
from their homes into refugee camps in Albania and Macedonia.
After a brief agreement in October 1998, brokered by Ambassador
Richard Holbrooke, violence flared up again in early 1999. In
January, a peace conference was convened in Rambouillet, France.
After much maneuvering and pressure, the KLA signed the
agreement, but the Serbs did not. Kosovar agreement was induced
in part by a letter dated February 22, 1999, from Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright promising a "referendum on the final status of
Kosovo after three years."' 8 After a round of ultimately futile last
minute meetings with Milosevic, the NATO bombing campaign
began on March 24, 1999.19
On June 10, 1999, NATO "suspended its bombing and the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 1244."20 U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1244 ("Resolution 1244") envisions the possibility of
independence. 21  But the Resolution is ambiguous in that it
16 Id.
17 See JUDAH, supra note 6, at 117-43 (detailing the strengthening of the
Kosovo Liberation Army ("KLA")).
18 Id. at 215.
19 Id. at 237.
20 Id. at 285.
21 See S. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 4011th meeting, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1244 (1999)
[hereinafter Resolution 1244] (embracing the Rambouillet Accords as a
touchstone), available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/172
/89/PDF/N9917289.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). Paragraph 8.3 of the
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recognizes Yugoslav sovereignty during the period of U.N. civil
administration. The ambiguity has permitted some lawyers and
policymakers to obstruct political and economic development in
Kosovo.
Resolution 1244 put the United Nations in the position, for the
first time, of exercising sovereignty and running a country.22
Resolution 1244 and subsequent implementing documents issued
by the Secretary General of the United Nations established
UNMIK 23 as a political trustee,24 exercising sovereignty on behalf
of the people of Kosovo. Under this arrangement, UNMIK
exercises legislative, executive, and judicial functions without
differentiating them very clearly.25 These governmental powers
continued even after elections were held and local judges,
legislators, and ministers took office under the "constitutional
framework." 26
Resolution 1244, while recognizing Yugoslav sovereignty,
27
vests UNMIK with "basic civilian administrative functions where
and as long as required." 28 This authority is to be transferred to
"local provisional institutions," 29 and eventually from them to
Rambouillet Accords provided for an international conference three years after
signing, at which the "will of the people" would substantially affect a
determination as to final status.
22 Id. art. 10 (authorizing the Secretary General to establish civil
administration for Kosovo).
23 Id. art. 6 (authorizing the appointment of a Special Representative of the
Secretary General to head civil administration).
24 This Article uses the terms "trust" and "political trustee" in the sense of an
entity that exercises sovereignty on behalf of another, rather than in the formal
sense that the term "trust territory" is used in Chapter 12 of the U.N. Charter. See
generally Perritt, Structures of Political Trusteeship, supra note 1; Henry H. Perritt, Jr.,
Stabilizing Kosovo: Enterprise Formation and Financial Markets, 2 J. GLOBAL FIN.
MARKETS 28 (2001) [hereinafter Perritt, Stabilizing Kosovo] (explaining the "trustee-
occupant" concept as defining the role of the U.N. Mission in Kosovo
("UNMIK")).
25 Resolution 1244, supra note 21, art. 11 (delineating the powers and
responsibilities of civil administration).
26 UNMIK Regulation 2001/9 (May 15, 2001) (formalizing a constitutional
framework for provisional self-government in Kosovo), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm.
27 Resolution 1244, supra note 21, pmbl. (reaffirming territorial integrity of the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY")).
28 Id. art. 11(b).
29 Id. art. 11(d).
30 Id. art. 11(f).
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institutions emerging from the final political agreement, under
UNMIK oversight.30 UNMIK is expressly directed to support "the
reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic
reconstruction." 31 Section 6 of UNMIK Regulation Number 1
expressly prcides for UNMIK's administration of movable and
immovable property registered in the name of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia ("FRY").32 UNMIK thus possesses the necessary
legal authority to adopt legislation and to take executive steps to
create and to transfer property rights necessary to economic
development and the attraction of foreign capital.
The sovereignty provisions of the preamble to Resolution 1244
were carefully worked out, and the Resolution in its entirety
represents a thoughtfully negotiated ambiguity with respect to the
question of whether Kosovo should be an independent sovereign
state or only "autonomous" within the Yugoslav federation.
UNMIK comprises four "pillars": Police and Justice (Pillar I),
Civil Administration (Pillar II), Institution Building (Pillar III), and
Economic Reconstruction (Pillar IV). Each pillar is headed by a
Deputy Special Representative. UNMIK itself is responsible for
Pillars I and II. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe ("OSCE") is responsible for Pillar III, and the EU is
responsible for Pillar IV.
While substantial international resources have been made
available to Kosovo, economic development beyond physical
infrastructure reconstruction and macroeconomic frameworks
31 Id. art. 11(g).
32 UNMIK began to use this authority in October 1999. See UNMIK
Regulation 1999/10 (Oct. 13, 1999) (abolishing discriminatory laws relating to
housing and property ownership, after determining they violated the human
rights of people of the territory), available at http://www.unmikonline.org
/regulations/1999/regO-99.htm. The regulation repealed two specific laws, one
on real estate transactions, and another on granting farm land to citizens. See also
UNMIK Regulation 1999/11 (Oct. 13, 1999) (authorizing UNMIK to use Kosovo's
Public Payment Service, headquartered in the capital, Prishtina, to collect and
disburse public funds), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/
regulations/1999/reg11-99.htm (last visited February 25, 2004); UNMIK
Regulation 1999/12 (Oct. 14, 1999) (authorizing the Post and Telecommunication
Enterprise of Kosovo ("PTK") to provide mail and phone services to Kosovo,
under the overall supervision of UNMIK), available at http://www.
unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/regl2-99.htm. By the new regulation, PTK
was given use of all public postal and telecommunication assets in the territory,
including any future expansions. UNMIK also nullified post-1989 Yugoslavia law
through its regulations. UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 (Dec. 12, 1999), available at
http://www.unminkonline.org/ regulations/1999/reg24-99.htm.
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seems to be almost an afterthought in UNMIK policy. For
example, the June 2003 report by the Secretary General to the
Security Council on the U.N. Mission in Kosovo 33 does not mention
economic development until the forty-second paragraph and then
contains seven relatively general paragraphs focused primarily on
public finance and privatization. 34
By early 2003, criticism of and frustration with UNMIK was
growing, fueled by impatience with the slow pace of transferring
final decisionmaking authority from UNMIK to local institutions.
Frustration with UNMIK is also fueled by a growing belief that
UNMIK institutions are not transparent, are frequently corrupt,
and in any event have no political accountability in the democratic
sense.
The most important barriers to private sector economic
development are unreliable electricity, high wages, high tariffs,
small markets, and a heavy flow of imports.
Kosovo's comparative advantages include: large numbers of
young people with skills and languages, and linkages with those in
the Albanian diaspora around the world which can be turned into
stronger and more traditional business linkages.
There are significant lignite reserves in Kosovo. It has the best
in the region, and the costs of extraction are only one-third those of
runner-up Bulgaria. So exporting energy in the form of lignite
itself or in the form of electricity is an interesting possibility. It is
true that Kosovo used to export electricity to Montenegro and
Croatia, but via a transmission system through Serbia. The Kosovo
Energy Corporation ("KEC" or "KEK") plan is completely outsized
unless it was built to produce power for export.
3. THE RECORD So FAR
Five years of political trusteeship by the international
community over Kosovo have produced an end to ethnic
cleansing, increased law and order, improved standards of living
for the majority Albanian population, produced three sets of
peaceful and fair elections - albeit with declining turnout - and
33 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2003/675 (2003), available at
http://www.un.dk/doc/s2003675.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
34 See id. paras. 42-49 (noting generally that there have been Economic and
Fiscal Council meetings, some voluntary compliance with tax laws, and high
numbers of illegal or unregistered public utility customers).
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overseen the functioning of local government institutions in the
executive, legislative, and judicial spheres. The political trustee,
UNMIK, has made far less progress, however, on the economic
front. After the war, the KLA took over vacant SOEs by posting
"property of the Kosovo state" posters. It is not altogether clear
that this was illegitimate because the Democratic Party of Kosovo
("PDK") led the interim government. But many people perceived
it as illegitimate. The prewar Kosovar Albanian businessmen were
the elites of the private sector, but after the postwar construction
boom, which now has tailed off, they are not sure of the "next big
thing." They have no skills in the modem sense, only instincts,
courage, and money. The unemployment rate remains at about
60%. Most of the good jobs are with international organizations,
all of which plan to cut back on their levels of activity and
employment in Kosovo. Only twelve of several hundred SOEs
were commercialized, 35 and only eighteen have taken the first steps
toward being privatized, before a new EU administrator of Pillar
IV "froze" privatization in October, 2003. According to most
estimates, only about sixty of these SOEs will develop into viable
businesses in a market economy. U.N. lawyers opposed to
fundamental reform of real property law and questioning the U.N.
mandate to restructure certain enterprises delayed repeatedly -for
two years and then again in late 2003 - operation of a Kosovo Trust
Agency ("KTA"),36 originally established in 2001.
Publicly owned enterprises such as the telephone company
("PTK"), KEC, the Trepca mines, the airport authority, and the
railways have not been privatized, lack clear direction, and are
inefficient. Electric power interruptions continue to be common;
telephone service, while reasonably reliable in major cities, is
absent in the countryside, and the plant is obsolete.
In some ways, however, the private sector is flourishing.
Almost immediately after the war, restaurants and filling stations
35 According to the "Lessons Learned and Analysis" unit of the EU Pillar of
UNMIK, Pillar IV, five of the twelve commercialization ventures were successful,
three were clearly failures, and two were too recent to assess. European Stability
Initiative, The Ottoman Dilemma: Power and Property Relations Under the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo: Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit of the EU Pillar of
UNMIK in Kosovo (Aug. 8, 2002) [hereinafter The Ottoman Dilemma], at
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi-document-id-35.pdf.
36 See Kosovo Trust Agency, Socially Owned Enterprises/Publicly Owned
Enterprises (2002) (describing the objectives of the Kosovo Trust Agency ("KTA")),
at http://www.kta-kosovo.org/soediv.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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sprang up everywhere. Private entrepreneurial energy created an
internet backbone whose revenues are growing at rates of 250%
per year, and which operates one of the most advanced wireless
backbones in the world. Local places providing lodging and
recreation such as swimming pools and hotels catering to
internationals are numerous and profitable. But most
entrepreneurs channel their energy into trade rather than
manufacturing or service undertakings attracting foreign
exchange. Individual Kosovars wanting to start a business do not
know how to do so and do not have a place to go to get basic
advice. Only sporadic organized efforts inform outside investors
about investment opportunities in Kosovo.
37
Neither the international community nor local economic and
political leaders have articulated an overall vision for self-
sufficiency in Kosovo.
Part of the problem is that the international community,
especially UNMIK and the World Bank, wasted too much time
wringing their hands over whether UNMIK's mandate under
Resolution 1244 and the World Bank's Charter permitted either of
them to take action necessary to stimulate local economic
development. The answer is clearly "yes" with respect to
Resolution 1244 under the Political Trustee concept.38 Now, the
World Bank has figured out a way to channel assistance through
UNMIK.39
Serious progress on the economic front in Kosovo requires a
rapid and successful privatization of SOEs and implementation of
a more robust plan for publicly owned enterprises. But more
importantly, it requires an initiative for development of SMEs that
37 The KTA has presented several "Invest in Kosovo" conferences in
Frankfurt, London, and New York. Regrettably, the expanded role for the Kosovo
Chamber of Commerce that the Author advocated in his 2001 article has not
occurred in any meaningful way. See Perritt, Stabilizing Kosovo, supra note 24, at
37-38.
38 See Perritt, Structures of Political Trusteeship, supra note 1.
39 A 2002 report explains how the World Bank can provide financial and
technical support by channeling it through UNMIK, even though its charter
would not permit direct grants to the government of Kosovo. World Bank,
Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Transitional Support Strategy, Report No.
24275-KOS, para. 26 (July 2, 2002) [hereinafter Transitional Support Strategy]
(discussing the International Development Association ("IDA") grants to UNMIK,
a subsidiary of a public international organization, permitted by article V(2)(c) of
IDA's Articles of Agreement), available at http://www.seerecon.org/
kosovo/ documents/ wbtss-kosovo.pdf.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
can provide jobs, achieve import substitution, and, eventually, earn
foreign exchange. Success with privatization and SME
development requires a clearer macroeconomic vision, a stronger
sense of where comparative advantage lies for Kosovar industry,
and the development of a richer array of financial intermediaries,
including small business assistance entities, more transactional
lawyers, professional education tracks, targeted investment funds,
and possibly stock market and futures exchanges. It also requires
progress on final status.
4. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1244 AS A ROADBLOCK
Creating acceptable conditions for private investment was an
essential part of nation-building in Kosovo from the outset.
UNMIK was slow to accept this responsibility for two reasons.
First, many observers of Kosovo thought that investment and
private sector engagement had to wait for a comprehensive rule of
law and market-oriented political institutions to be established.
That was a mistake; nothing will ever be fixed if the private sector
or policymakers wait for these changes before beginning economic
development efforts. Instead, economic development must be
integrated with building a rule of law, and both must proceed in
tandem. That should have been the case in Kosovo from the end of
the war, but, regrettably, economic development has always had a
lower priority than UNMIK consolidation, war crimes
investigations, organizing elections, and facilitating interethnic
cooperation.
Second, UNMIK's lawyers misinterpreted Resolution 1244 so
as to limit UNMIK's power over the factors of production in
Kosovo. They interpreted the explicit reference in the preamble of
Resolution 1244 to the continued sovereignty of the FRY over
Kosovo as a limitation on any change in property interests. That
refusal to allow UNMIK to alter property interests and the
resulting uncertainty created negative consequences for investors.
The acknowledgement of sovereignty in the preamble was not
a legal barrier to thoroughgoing U.N. efforts to rationalize the
Kosovar property regime. While Resolution 1244 acknowledges
FRY sovereignty, it also grants plenary powers of "civil
administration" to the U.N. In addition, it explicitly authorizes the
U.N. to transfer these powers to local provisional authorities and
ultimately to institutions created or provided for in the eventual
political settlement.
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4.1. UNMIK, as a Trustee, Has Broad Powers
UNMIK should be understood as a political trustee40 for
Kosovo, exercising most of the important attributes of sovereignty
on behalf of the people of Kosovo. UNMIK has the same power
over property as a common law trustee,41 and also has authority to
transfer these powers to interim governmental entities, private
investors, and institutions defined by the ultimate political
settlement. The FRY has, at most, a defeasable reversionary
interest,42 which an ultimate political settlement might alter. 43
Although there is no provision of Resolution 1244 that
explicitly provides for termination of the U.N. trusteeship and the
ultimate disposition of Kosovo, there is a pledge to respect the
territorial integrity of the FRY for the duration of the trust.44 There
40 In 1973, Allan Gerson developed the idea of trustee-occupant to explain the
status of the West Bank. See Allan Gerson, Trustee-Occupant: The Legal Status of
Israel's Presence in the West Bank, 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1973) (submitting the
concept of "trustee-occupancy" as a standard move reflective of the rights of
Jordan and of the West Bank inhabitants, and descriptive of Israel's powers and
responsibilities in administering that area). The concept of the "political trustee"
used in this Article is an adaptation of the trustee-occupant concept, developed
more fully in Perritt, Structures of Political Trusteeship, supra note 1.
41 The analysis of common law trusts is adapted from material written by
John M. Scheib, member of the Virginia and District of Columbia bars, for an
earlier paper on U.N. administration of Kosovo. A trustee has the power to
transfer trust property, even when a transfer cuts off reversionary interests, as
long as the trustee exercises the power consistently with the terms of the trust and
its purpose.
42 Actually, it is not necessary to know the owner of the reversionary interest
in order to understand the powers and duties of the trustee. As a trustee, the U.N.
has similar powers to change laws and institutions as appropriate to pursue the
goal of self-determination and economic growth. Such exercise of powers in
pursuit of that goal will benefit the Kosovars, the beneficiaries of the trust.
43 Resolution 1244, supra note 21, art. 11(e). Even if the identity of the
beneficiaries of the trust is ambiguous, this does not invalidate the trust. Under
the law of trusts, it is not necessary that the beneficiary be known at the creation
of the trust. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 112 (1959). The beneficiary must
be ascertainable when the trust is created, but that includes a beneficiary who is
not yet ascertained or in existence at the time the trust is created. Id. cmt. c. Thus,
the Kosovo beneficiary could be an existing state, such as Yugoslavia, or it could
be a state that subsequently comes into existence, such as an independent Kosovo.
Alternatively, one can conclude that the people of Kosovo are the beneficiaries of
the trust, as suggested in the text, and that it is the reversioner and the transferee
of legal title who is to be ascertained later. Under this interpretation, there is no
difficulty with the identity of the beneficiary, and the above analysis, applying
section 112 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, is unnecessary.
44 Resolution 1244, supra note 21, pmbl. ("Reaffirming the commitment of all
Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic
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is a further obligation, in Article 11(e) of the Resolution, for the
trustee to facilitate a political process designed to determine
Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet
accords.45 Thus, the identity of the reversioner is an open question
accompanied by a duty in the trustee to resolve that question,
much like when a court holds property in trust until it can
determine the rightful owner of the property, or when a common
law trustee enjoys a power of appointment. 46
In the meantime, as a trustee, UNMIK cannot waste the trust
assets, must invest the asset prudently, and use reasonable care
and skill to make the trust property productive.47 Resolution 1244
includes authority for economic reconstruction and development;48
UNMIK must work prudently to reconstruct and develop Kosovo's
assets, including its real property. Like any trustee, UNMIK may
sell trust property for the benefit of the trust and its beneficiary;49 it
can privatize industries and otherwise make transfers of property
to facilitate economic development.
These trust concepts are not unique to the Anglo-American
legal tradition. Indeed, many scholars assert that Roman, German,
and Islamic legal traditions embodied trust concepts even before
they arose in England.50
4.2. Displacing Discriminatory Property Law
Resolution 1244 empowers UNMIK to displace discriminatory
laws and those inconsistent with international human rights
principles. A series of discriminatory laws enacted by the FRY
after 1989, including the alteration of traditional "social
ownership" of many enterprises, cloud property ownership in
Kosovo.51 Beginning in 1989, Slobodan Milosevic accelerated his
of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final
Act and annex 2...").
45 Id. art. 11(e).
46 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 21 (1959).
47 Id. § 181.
48 Resolution 1244, supra note 21, art. 11(g).
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 190(b) (1959).
50 See Avisheh Avini, The Origins of the Modern English Trust Revisited, 70 TUL.
L. REV. 1139 (1995) (discussing several theories concerning the origins of trusts);
Thomas B. Lemann, Trust: A Common-Law Institution in a Civilian Context, 8 TUL.
EUR. & Civ. L.F. 53 (1993).
51 See generally DE1"T OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND RULE OF L., ORG. FOR SECURITY
AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN Kosovo 3 (2002-2003)
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efforts to displace Kosovar Albanian control over state and social
property (two distinct categories) in Kosovo, shifting control to
Serbian and foreign ownership, often through integration of
Kosovar and Serbian enterprises. The result was Serb, French, and
Italian ownership of many facilities and buildings that were
needed to establish public functions and major enterprises. The
U.N., by initially recognizing Yugoslav law as of March 1999,
appeared to recognize these ownership interests.
52  In early
December 1999, however, UNMIK promulgated Regulation
Number 1999/24, repealing its initial determination to apply
Yugoslav law that was in effect in June of 1999, substituting instead
UNMIK regulations as primary law, with Yugoslav law that was in
effect as of 1989 as a fallback.53 The applicable-law regulation
permits judges and other persons responsible for interpreting law
to apply post-1989 law when it is not covered by UNMIK
regulations or pre-1989 law and is "not discriminatory."
54 In the
case of privatization, the proviso permitting application of post-
1989 law is inoperative, because UNMIK's privatization
regulations55 occupy the field. There is, therefore, coverage by
UNMIK regulations, and the predicate "not covered by UNMIK
regulations" is not satisfied.
Invalidating the discriminatory property laws is an example of
the kinds of powers that should have been exercised aggressively
by the political trustee, recognizing such powers as entirely faithful
to the duties imposed by Resolution 1244.
(describing the peculiarities of the property rights regime in Kosovo, including
emphasis on "use" rather than full ownership; lack of clarity in social ownership
concepts; unrecorded informal transfers by Albanians during periods of
discrimination; and complex conflicts between UNMIK regulations and pre-1989
Yugoslav law), at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/property/
property~report-eng_20030619.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
52 UNMIK Regulation 1999/1 § 3 (July 25, 1999), available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg0l-99.htm, repealed by
UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, supra note 32, § 1.1.
53 UNMIK Regulation 1999/24, supra note 32, § 1.1.
54 Id.§1.2.
55 UNMIK Regulation 2002/12 (June 13, 2002) available at http://www.unmik
online.org/regulations/2002/Re2002_12.pdf; UNMIK Regulation 2002/13 (june
13, 2002), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/2002/RE2002-
13.pdf.
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5. THE MACROECONOMY
Two unusual features support Kosovo's economy: 1)
expenditures by the international community and 2) remittances
by Kosovars working in other countries. In 2003, Kosovo's GDP
was $2.16 billion, or $1,122 per capita. The real GDP growth rate
was 7.4% in 2002 and projected to be 4-5% in 2003.56 Consumption
was 126% of GDP and investment was 38% of GDP, down from
45% of GDP in 2002. Exports and imports of goods and services
were 12.3% and 88.7% of GDP, respectively. Net transfers from
abroad were 22.3% of GDP from private sources and 41.7% of GDP
from public sources. The 22.3% was almost entirely remittances
from Kosovars living outside Kosovo.57
The World Bank and the IMF observe that the Kosovo economy
must be prepared to absorb the impact of declining outside
investment and declining expatriate expenditures in Kosovo.58 The
IMF projects that foreign transfers will fall from 67% of GDP in
2001 to 15-20% of GDP in 2004.59 The difference must be made up
by increased domestic production.
International institutions hire Kosovars and pay them higher
salaries than they can earn in domestic activities. The vast majority
of young professionals work for international institutions, as
opposed to working for the local governmental institutions or
striking out on their own in private business or professional
services.60 In addition, international institutions are paying for
56 3 U.N. Development Programme & U.S. Agency for International
Development, Kosovo Early Warning Report, at 3 (Jan.-Apr. 2003) [hereinafter Early
Warning Report], available at http://www.kosovo.undp.org/Projects/EWS/
ewm3 eng.pdf.
57 Transitional Support Strategy, supra note 39, Annex I. The remittances
represent part of the flow from the Kosovar Diaspora that provides special
opportunities for financial intermediaries to steer savings into productive
investment opportunities.
58 Present levels of 10,000 UNMIK staff, 5,000-10,000 expatriates working for
other inter-governmental organizations ("IGOs") and non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"), and 40,000 NATO-led Kosovo Forces ("KFOR") troops
will decline, as will foreign transfers. DIM1TRI G. DEMEKAS ET AL., Kosovo:
INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND GROWTH 7, 14 (2002). 50,000
expatriates presently in Kosovo and donor support of $500 million-half of gross
domestic product ("GDP")-in 2001 will decline to half that level in 2003, when
expatriate presence also is reduced. Transitional Support Strategy, supra note 39, at
3,5.
59 DEMEKAS, supra note 58, at 14.
60 A December 2002 labor market survey showed, however, that only 67% of
those employed were working in the private sector and agriculture, while 29%
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much of the infrastructure investment. Road signs are all over
Kosovo identifying the donor who paid for a particular road
improvement. Any plan for the Kosovo economy must specify
how these sources of national income will be replaced as the
international community withdraws and reduces its financial
commitment, as is already beginning to occur. Continuing to work
as a lawyer or an economist for a nongovernmental organization
("NGO"), intergovernmental organization ("IGO"), or the offices of
foreign state is not likely to prove a very good career plan for many
Kosovars. What else will they do?
Stimulating SME development and accelerating privatization
are important for the creation of jobs. But enterprise formation and
restructuring require capital, which requires savings, which
requires income.
That means, in the short run, that the economic development
plan for Kosovo must encourage those working for international
institutions to save significant parts of their salaries. It also means
that other streams of income from abroad must be identified and
examined to exploit potential for savings.
The other source of international income, which may or may
not be temporary, comprises remittances -money sent home by
Kosovars working in other countries. Remittances usually are paid
to family members and are extremely difficult to value because of
the absence of a banking system in Kosovo until recently and the
tendency for remittances to be paid in cash or in kind.
A rough estimate is useful. There are about 600,000 Kosovars
living abroad. If one assumes that half of these earn compensation
at an average of $25,000 per year and send 25% of that home, that
amounts to $1.8 billion per year in remittances. The population in
Kosovo is about 1.8 million, so the figure translates into $1,000 per
capita in additional national income.
61
5.1. Labor Markets
Even if Kosovo does not establish a strong enough economy to
make up for the departure of the internationals, supply and
demand in international labor markets will produce an
equilibrium. Those Kosovars who are younger, better trained, and
were working for SOEs, public enterprises, and the government. Early Warning
Report, supra note 56, para. 8.
61 World Bank and IMF figures estimate remittances to be about 20% of this
amount. Transitional Support Strategy, supra note 39, Annex I.
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capable of speaking English, German, or French will take jobs
outside the country and will bid down their wage demands until
they get jobs. That will tend to increase per capita income for those
remaining in Kosovo in two ways: 1) by reducing the population
remaining in Kosovo and 2) by increasing the flow of remittances.
But depopulation, especially in the form of a "brain drain," is
not an attractive scenario. Moreover, the possibility of more
Kosovars going to other countries to work depends on the
willingness of other countries to accept them. Throughout the
1990s, the Milosevic apartheid created conditions that qualified
many, if not most, Kosovars seeking work elsewhere for asylum.
Now, and in the future, asylum abroad will be much harder to get,
and there is no guarantee that countries with good jobs will throw
open their doors to immigration by Kosovars seeking those jobs.
5.2. Savings and Investments
The second set of macroeconomic questions has to do with the
level and nature of savings and investment. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that the savings rate for Kosovar Albanians is relatively
high.62 The level of savings available for domestic investment,
however, is another question. Much of the domestic savings may
go to other countries for safekeeping against possible future
economic or political upheavals or be held in the form of cash.
Neither cash nor foreign bank accounts are available for domestic
investment.63 On the other hand, the experiences of ProCredit
Bank (formerly Micro Enterprise Bank or "MEB")64 and Reifessen
Bank (formerly the American Bank in Kosovo or "ABK") suggest
that when trustworthy savings institutions are established and
promoted effectively, Kosovars are willing to put their money in
such domestic institutions, which then channel it into productive
investment.
Questions also exist as to how much of the actual domestic
62 The formal World Bank and IMF figures are not very helpful in
quantifying savings because consumption exceeds GDP. See generally Transitional
Support Strategy, supra note 39.
63 Cash, of course, may be invested in family enterprises.
64 As of December 2002, the Micro Enterprise Bank ("MEB") claimed to have
banking relationships with 50% of Kosovar households. MICRO ENTERPRISE BANK,
MEB/PROCREDIT MANAGEMENT REPORT 4 (2002) [hereinafter MEB/PROCREDIT
MANAGEMENT REPORT], at http://www.procreditbank-kos.com/pdf/MEB-
ManagementReport2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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investment is productive in terms of the capacity to produce future
income. Capital market institutions and other business formation
services are almost entirely lacking, and that makes it less likely
that the available savings will be channeled into productive
investment. Anyone who has driven around Kosovo realizes that
an enormous fraction of total investment is going into the
construction of large, detached houses. Based on anecdotal
evidence, including personal conversations by the Author, many of
the builders of these houses have vague notions that some sort of
business will occupy the first floor.
Any modem economy relies on its pension system as an
important source of savings. UNMIK has established the basic
structure for a pension system in Kosovo.65 The investment policy
expressed in the UNMIK regulation allows pension trust funds to
be invested domestically only in registered securities.66 Pension
payroll taxes will begin to produce efficient savings that can be
channeled into productive domestic investment as Kosovo capital
markets mature, depending on the investment policies of the
pension fund managers. The content of these pension
administration policies has enormous implications for economic
development in Kosovo.
Much controversy surrounds the decision of the pension
program administrators to invest pension plan assets outside of
Kosovo. The decision was engendered by the absence of any
financial markets institution within Kosovo that would permit
investment in Kosovar enterprises while maintaining prudent
diversification. The existence of some kind of investment fund, or
at least a stock market, offering shares or holding interest in
private Kosovar enterprises would facilitate keeping some pension
plan assets inside the country, adding to the savings available for
productive investment.
Similarly, ProCredit Bank has been criticized for obtaining far
more in deposits from Kosovars than it loans to Kosovar
65 See UNMIK Regulation 2001/35 (Dec. 22, 2001) (establishing the pension
system in Kosovo), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/
2 00 1/
RE percent202001-35.pdf.
66 See id. § 10.4 (listing allowable pension asset investments). The regulation
explicitly prohibits investment of pension fund assets in: 1) securities that are
either unlisted or not publicly traded, 2) assets not capable of alienation, 3)
derivatives, and 4) real estate or physical assets not listed on organized markets
and for which valuation is uncertain. Id. § 10.8.
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enterprises, investing the rest outside the country.67 ProCredit
Bank itself, however, reports rapidly increasing domestic loan
volumes and describes major success stories of Kosovar businesses
in which it has invested. 68
The ABK (now "Reiffeisenbank") told the Author in 2003 that
its loan-to-deposit ratios are close to 100%, but ABK sources report
that the money available for investment exceeds the number of
good business plans that are presented to lending institutions.
Many Kosovar business professionals identify the tariff
structure as a significant impediment to developing viable business
models. Raw materials and machinery are taxed at 25-26% (10%
tariff plus 16% value added tax ["VAT"]). Finished goods come in
through Serbia and Montenegro with no tax at all because these are
not designated "borders." This squeezes margins for Kosovar
manufacturers to the vanishing point. Fixing the situation does not
require policymakers to embrace a protective tariff policy; it simply
requires reducing import barriers for raw materials and machinery.
There was a proposal before the Economic and Fiscal Council 69 to
reduce the tariff for machinery to zero, but the World Bank
vociferously opposed this and, in the end, prevailed. Economists
argue that both the import duties and the VAT provide a level
playing field for domestic Kosovar producers. A producer must
pay a VAT on raw materials and capital goods, but receives credit
for this VAT when remitting a VAT charge to its customers. 70
67 The audited financial statements for the bank for 2002 show a loan to
deposit ratio of less than 10%. See MICRO ENTERPRISE BANK, MEB/PROCREDIT
ANNUAL REPORT, 22 (2002), at http://www.procreditbankkos.com/pdf/MEB-
AuditReport2002.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). Thirty-one percent of the loans
were to the service sector, 53% to the trading sector, 11% to manufacturing, less
than 0.5% to agriculture, and 5% to private individuals. Id. at 33.
68 MEB/PROCREDIT MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 64, at 4.
69 UNMIK Regulation 2002/10 (May 6, 2002) (establishing the Economic and
Fiscal Council ("EFC") as an advisory body to the Special Representative of the
Secretary General ("SRSG")), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/
regulations/2002/RE2002_10.pdf. The following comprise the membership of the
EFC: the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Chairman), the Principal
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, the Deputy Special
Representative of the Secretary-General for Civil Administration, the Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Economic Reconstruction, the
Prime Minister, the President of the Assembly of Kosovo, the Minister of Finance
and Economy, the Minister representing the Kosovo Serb community, and
another Minister nominated by the Prime Minister and confirmed by the SRSG.
Id. Annex.
70 For example, suppose a trading company pays 100 euros for raw materials
[Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/4
ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY FOR KOSOVO
Import duties provide a level playing field because everyone is
taxed at the same rate. A Croatian milk producer pays 10% import
duty on the total price of its milk, which includes capital costs. A
Kosovar milk producer pays 10% on its capital goods, placing them
in the same position. However, Kosovars argue that they are still
at a disadvantage because of the long period of neglect of capital
assets, combined with wartime destruction, meaning that they
must rebuild their capital base and thus end up paying more in
duty. Perceived inequities also may result from producers who
buy in the formal sector, and thus pay tax, but sell in the informal
sector. These producers do not collect tax, or their operations in
the informal sector deprive them of the necessary documentation
to receive credit for VAT paid. Kosovar producers also receive a
rebate on import duties when they export. Proposals to reduce the
import duty substantially, across the board, are under
consideration.
Momentum is building to develop a "Balkans without borders"
through a set of bilateral agreements that would eliminate tariffs
for trade within the Balkans. A free trade zone would permit trade
and investment patterns to be developed according to the wishes
of entrepreneurs and natural relationships. This, more than any
likely formal economic or political structures, would permit
Albanians in various political territories to forge close relationships
with each other. It is important to understand, however, that
negotiation of a free trade area agreement for the Western Balkans
may be a mixed blessing. While it will open up markets for
finished goods to large Albanian populations in Albania,
Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro, other results may make
matters worse. Finished goods are more likely to come from
within the region covered by a free trade agreement, while raw
materials such as petroleum and machinery are more likely to
come from outside the region and, therefore, from outside any free
trade area.
6. MICROECONOMICS
In the absence of a macroeconomic vision, it is difficult to be
specific about what forms of enterprise creation are most likely to
produce a sustainable economy. It is clear that Kosovo's economy
and sells the materials for 200 euros. It pays 16% value added tax ("VAT") on the
raw materials, or 16 euros. It collects 16% VAT on the products it sells, or 32
euros. It remits only the difference -16 euros -to the taxing authority.
20041
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will flourish in the aggregate only if it produces a substantial and
reliable stream of foreign exchange. In other words, Kosovo must
be in a position to export goods and services.71 This is only
possible in those sectors where it has a comparative advantage.
This is only one aspect of an essential tailoring of economic
development policy to the unique circumstances and experiences
of the target territory and population:
[T]here is growing evidence that desirable institutional
arrangements have a large element of context specificity,
arising from differences in historical trajectories,
geography, political economy, or other initial
conditions.... In the words of Douglass North: "economies
that adopt the formal rules of another economy will have
very different performance characteristics than the first
economy because of different informal norms and
enforcement."72
6.1. Mhich Sectors Are Most Likely To Be Viable?
One can begin an analysis of viable sectors by stepping through
the obvious possibilities. The mining sector is one candidate,
although it would require large-scale foreign investment. Kosovo
historically was a source of raw materials for the rest of
Yugoslavia, but its proven reserves for many minerals such as
nickel have been nearly exhausted. On the other hand, Kosovo has
substantial lignite reserves, with extraction costs estimated to be
less than one-third of the level in Bulgaria, the next most attractive
source. Its mining facilities, however, are obsolete and inefficient,
and some of the largest mines-for metals, not lignite-are the
subject of potentially violent conflicts between Serbs and
71 In the near term, Kosovo's economic situation can be improved by
developing productive enterprises that provide import substitution, especially in
food and building materials.
72 DANi RODRIK ET AL., INSTITUTIONS RULE: THE PRIMACY OF INSTITUTIONS OVER
GEOGRAPHY AND INTEGRATION IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 22 (Int'l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper No. WP/02/189, 2002) [hereinafter RODRIK, INSTITUTIONS RULE]
(quoting Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM. ECON.
REV. 359, 366 (1994)).
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Albanians.
Even though Kosovo once exported electricity, the current poor
state of its electricity-generating and distribution systems dims
hopes that this is a sector for the future. Some analysts and
policymakers favor the idea of a seven- to ten-year concession for
an outside investor who could rehabilitate lignite mining facilities,
build new high-efficiency generating plants, rehabilitate electric
distribution lines running to Montenegro, Serbia, and Macedonia,
and earn a good rate of return by exporting electricity. The
political risk of this plan would be greatly reduced by the
realization of a plan to build a spur from a new 400 kilovolt-amps
("KVA," equivalent to kilowatts) distribution line from Tirana to
Podgorica, the capital of Montenegro, that would tie Kosovo's
electric grid into the larger European grid through Albania. This
would permit it to import and export electricity according to
seasonal variations in supply and demand, without being at the
mercy of political vicissitudes in Serbia, Montenegro, or
Macedonia. The mining, generating-plant, and distribution-line
rehabilitation costs could amoui it to $1 billion.
This approach is superior to mining the lignite and simply
shipping it out of the country because the rights of way and some
of the physical structures for electric distribution already exist and
merely need to be upgraded. In contrast, it would be necessary to
build a new railroad or road almost from scratch to transport the
lignite itself. Unfortunately, the European Union has blocked a
USAID initiative to finance a management contract for KEK that
would permit implementation of this approach.
In telecommunications, Kosovo has no more strategic
advantage than any one of a number of places. Kosovo does not
have an attractive telecommunications infrastructure, except for
the broadband wireless network built by Internet Project Kosovo
("IPKO"). The IPKO network is oriented toward domestic
telecommunications and is not designed as a transit network for
international communications.
Food, lodging, and entertainment certainly are possibilities.
Kosovars have proven their capacity to establish restaurants. The
food and service are much better than elsewhere in central, eastern,
and southeastern Europe, but this sector does not generate any
foreign exchange in the absence of tourism to make up for a
declining international presence. The attention drawn to Kosovo
in recent years, as well as its beauty as a former outpost of the
Ottoman Empire and its mountains, could attract some foreign
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tourists, but only if investment is attracted for that purpose.
Additionally, these tourist attractions must be marketed effectively
in order to be successful.
Agriculture will require much work to become competitive
because of the primitive character of most of the farms, which are
very small and located in villages with very poor infrastructure.
However, many observers think that white wines73 and potato
products hold promise for exports.
Manufacturing is a possibility for any economy, as long as
telecommunications and transportation infrastructures are
sufficient to support it, and as long as an appropriately skilled
workforce with a good work ethic is available. Because Kosovo
has at least two of these prerequisites (skilled workforce and
telecommunications), wood processing, lumber construction
materials, 74 metalworking, and textiles and garment making75 can
eventually penetrate export markets. Its internet protocol ("IP'")
telecommunications infrastructure, based on the IPKO wireless
data network, is world-class. Its workforce is energetic, self-reliant,
and may have the skills for many manufacturing jobs. The
transportation infrastructure, on the other hand, is terrible. The
country has only one airport, near Prishtina, its rail system has
barely begun to operate again along a few routes, and its roads are
in marginal condition, although much improved since the war.
One of the most useful transportation infrastructure projects, a
good highway between Prishtina and Dures, Albania (a seaport),
has not begun, due to a combination of passivity by local political
leaders and concerns of the international community that this
would tie Kosovo too closely to Albania. Building this highway
should receive much greater priority.
Some entrepreneurs envision Kosovo building professional
service firms that would deliver their services over the internet.
Kosovo's comparative advantage is significant because of its high
literacy rates. Also important is the number of its young people
that have studied outside the country, learned major foreign
languages, and picked up competitive professional skills in law,
73 There is a modem winery near Gjokova. As well, dairy products, egg
production, and animal feed for dairy and egg production could provide
significant import substitution.
74 Some people think that timber production would take a long time to begin
because most of the timber is on state-owned land.
75 This sector can be efficient only if successful privatization occurs.
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economics, architecture, and technology. It is possible that high-
tech incubators could accelerate the formation of such professional
service firms.
6.2. The Role of SMEs
In the first conversation the Author had with senior officials of
the Interim Government of Kosovo in 1999, he urged emphasis on
small and medium enterprise development as the only practicable
way to create jobs.
The Bologna Charter 2000 on SME Policies, adopted by
representatives from forty-seven countries meeting under
sponsorship of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development ("OECD"), 76 recognized that "entrepreneurship and
a dynamic SME sector are important for restructuring economies
and for combating poverty." 77  It recognizes that SME
competitiveness would benefit from a regulatory environment that
does not impose undue burdens on SMEs, education that fosters an
innovative and entrepreneurial culture, and effective access to
financial services, "particularly to seed, working (sic) and
development capital." 78  In particular, it recommended that
"financial barriers to innovation in SMEs be reduced by: i)
facilitating the development of market mechanisms for equity
financing, and related services, especially for innovative start-
ups... ."79 It further suggested that partnerships involving private
actors, NGOs, and different levels and sectors of public
administration could be helpful, and that self-help organizations
such as business associations and technical assistance centers can
foster international cooperation and partnership among SMEs and
can improve access to information, financial and technological
resources, and new markets.
Western Balkan countries, including Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,
Serbia, and Montenegro, adopted the European Charter for Small
76 Including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and Canada.
77 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT ("OECD-),
Bologna Charter 2000: The Bologna Charter on SME Policies (June 15, 2000),
available at http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1866232
_1 11l1,00.html.
78 Id.
79 Id.
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Enterprises80 at the Thessalonica Summit, in June 2003. Kosovo
was not empowered to adopt the charter because Kosovo is not yet
a state.
7. DEVELOPMENT THEORY
The economics profession has recognized that institutions
matter in achieving a prosperous private sector. 81 Private initiative
and incentives are important to economic growth in countries in
transition.82 Private entrepreneurial energy is unlikely in the
absence of institutional underpinnings of market economies,
including a clearly defined system of property rights, a regulatory
means for curbing fraud and anticompetitive behavior, social and
political institutions that limit risk and manage social conflicts, rule
of law, and clean government. 83 Effective strategies "of institution-
building must not overemphasize best-practice 'blueprints' at the
expense of local experimentation." 84 Laws not only must be
written, they must be "backed up by the use of sanctioned force."
85
In property reform, the key characteristic is "'control' rather than
ownership .... Formal property rights do not count for much if
they do not confer control rights." 86 Moreover,
[T]he quality of institutions trumps everything else. Once
institutions are controlled for, integration has no direct
effect on incomes, while geography has at best weak direct
effects. Trade often enters the income regression with the
"wrong" (i.e., negative) sign, as do many of the
80 THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROPEAN CHARTER FOR SMALL ENTERPRISES
(June 19-20, 2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/
enterprise-policy/charter/charteren.pdf. The charter commits signatories to ten
principles: education and training for entrepreneurship, cheaper and faster start-
up, better legislation and regulation, availability of skills, improving online access,
getting more out of the Single Market, taxation and financial matters,
strengthening the technological capacity of small enterprises, making use of
successful e-business models and developing top-class small business support,
and developing stronger, more effective representation of small enterprises'
interests at the Union and national level.
81 See Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth, supra note 2, at 4-5.
82 Id. at 1.
83 Id. at 2.
84 Id. at 3.
85 Id. at 4.
86 Id. at 5.
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geographical indicators. By contrast, our measure of
property rights and the rule of law always enters with the
correct sign, and is statistically significant, often with t-
statistics that are very large.87
Deep cleavages along ethnic or income lines can impede
political decisionmaking and implementation of formal political
decisions to the detriment of economic development. The risk is
"coordination failure in which social factions fail to coordinate on
outcomes which would be of mutual benefit."8 8 As Dani Rodrik
writes, "healthy societies have a range of institutions that make
such colossal coordination failures less likely. The rule of law, a
high-quality judiciary, representative political institutions, free
elections, independent trade unions, social partnerships,
institutionalized representation of minority groups, and social
insurance are examples of such institutions."8 9 In other words,
strategies for economic development focused on institution-
building converge with strategies for developing liberal
democracy. 90
Moreover, institutionalist strategies connect nicely with the
goal of building "rule of law," as long as "rule of law" is
understood to encompass private law as well as public law-a
framework for entrepreneurship as well as a framework for human
rights.
8. PRIVATIZATION
Privatization is at the top of the list of most neo-liberal
economic reformers. It took a long time to rise to the top of
UNMIK's list, however. After much wrangling and delay, the
frequently obstructionist legal advisors to the Special
Representative of the Secretary General ("SRSG")91 were finally
87 RODRIK, INSTITUTIONS RULE, supra note 72, at 4.
88 Rodrik, Institutions for High-Quality Growth, supra note 2, at 10.
89 Id.
90 See FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMCORACY AT
HOME AND ABROAD 252 (2003); Perritt, Structures of Political Trusteeship, supra note
1.
91 The SRSG is the head of UNMIK. Every well-informed observer of
developments in Kosovo says that the local legal advisor to the SRSG is
unaccountably obstructionist, making bizarre interpretations of Resolution 1244
and strained interpretations of the constitutional framework, in virtually every
case taking positions that delay decisions, and impede economic development of,
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persuaded, in 2002, to allow the establishment of a structure for
privatization. This is reflected in UNMIK Regulation 2002/12,
which transfers complete control over all of the assets of publicly
owned and socially owned property to a new KTA, an agency
independent of both UNMIK and local government institutions.92
The board of the KTA approved its operational plan on
February 25, 2003, and identified six SOEs for tender, beginning
the privatization process.93 A four-month delay ensued, however,
because UNMIK lawyers had further objections to necessary
property rights transfers.94 Privatization finally began, with bids
received on an initial six SOEs by July 14, 2003. One hundred three
bids were received, and another nineteen were due by August
2003, and bids were due on a third group by November 2003.
More than 130 million euros were bid in the second round of
privatization, with approximately 23.6 million euros in
commitments accepted.
Despite this promising start, a new Deputy SRSG from the EU,
Nickolas Lambsdorff, upon arriving in Kosovo in October 2003,
"froze" privatization because of concerns and confusion about
legal immunity and claims by Serb interests that certain enterprises
being considered for tender were not within the jurisdiction of the
KTA because they had legally been transformed after 1989. It is
unfortunate that this interruption occurred because it creates
uncertainty likely to discourage investors. Mr. Lambsdorff
appointed a new Managing Director of KTA, Marie Fucci, who
insisted on uprooting the conceptually sound operational policies
of KTA, and substituting policies that would discourage
investment by saddling investors with the uncertain liabilities of
SOEs. Local Kosovar governmental institutions opposed the
Lambsdorff/Fucci blockages to privatization, pointing out that
their positons conformed substantially with those of Serbia, which
opposes privatization altogether.
The concept of Regulation 2002/12 is sound: it strips liabilities
and transfer of further power to, local institutions.
92 See UNMIK Regulation 2002/12, supra note 55 (describing the board of
directors and its authority).
93 Press Release, Kosovo Trust Agency ("KTA"), Approval of KTA
Operational Policies Green Light for Privatisation to Begin (Feb. 25, 2003), at
http://www.kta-kosovo.org/ktapress/pr0022.pdf.
94 Of the first two groups of twenty-five SOEs, construction is the dominant
sector (14 million euros in revenue), followed by consumer goods (5 million
euros), tourism, and pharmaceuticals (1.5 million euros each).
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from the assets of publicly owned and socially owned enterprises,
thus allowing the assets to attract private investment capital, while
the claims against those assets must be asserted before the KTA.
Private investors acquire the assets of these enterprises by bidding
in an open-tender process. The amount of the successful bid is
paid to the KTA, which then holds those payments in trust for
claimants. Conceptually, the KTA approach builds a wall between
the assets and the investor, on the one hand, and the liabilities on
the other. This is necessary in order to attract private investment
to any of these enterprises because of the complexity of the claims.
The model resembles that used by the U.S. Congress to save the
Northeast and Midwest railroads after bankruptcy proceedings
proved inadequate. Under the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of
1973, 95 the United States Railway Association, roughly analogous
to the KTA, decided which properties should be preserved for rail
transportation and which need not be. The rail properties were
conveyed to a new federally chartered private corporation,
Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail"). 96 The other properties
remained in the estates of the bankrupt railroads. The estates
received stock in Conrail plus $500 million in government-
guaranteed bonds.97 In subsequent litigation, the Supreme Court
of the United States determined that no unconstitutional taking of
property without just compensation had occurred because the
estates were entitled to litigate the fairness of what they received
for their property in the United States Claims Court. If that court
determined the amount to be inadequate, it could award a
deficiency judgment against the U.S. government under the Tucker
Act.
98
The Kosovo privatization process differs in two respects from
the Regional Rail Reorganization process in the United States.
First, the Rail Act covered only one industry; the Kosovo
privatization process covers all SOEs. Second, the Tucker Act
remedy against the U.S. government provided far more reliable
compensation for any deficiency in value of properties than is
present in the Kosovo privatization scheme. The U.N. has asserted
95 45 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq. (1973).
96 The Author was a senior lawyer of Conrail from 1976-1981.
97 See Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp., 419 U.S. 102, 111 (1974)
(describing the structure of the Rail Act).
98 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1996). See generally Blanchette v. Connecticut Gen. Ins.
Corp., 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
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immunity from any recovery. The local Kosovar government has
uncertain creditworthiness. The uncertain nature of judicial
remedies for inadequate compensation or other violations of rights
associated with the privatization process is a further distinction.99
Still, disputes are inevitable in any privatization or other corporate
reorganization process. The designers of the privatization process
for Kosovo recognized this reality and established the Special
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Kosovo with exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve these disputes. To avoid local bias,
international judges decide cases filed in the Special Chamber.
The privatization process will unravel if lawsuits can be heard
in national courts around the world. In September 2003, a breach
of contract lawsuit arising out of privatization of an SOE was filed
in a New York state court. It was subsequently removed to federal
court, and the Author prepared an amicus brief on behalf of the
Government of Kosovo, arguing that the United States District
Court should dismiss the case on immunity or forum non
conveniens grounds, since governmental immunity of UNMIK and
KTA had been waived only to the extent of cases filed in the
Special Court, which in any event is an adequate and exclusive
forum.
Sorting out claims to state-owned enterprises in any socialist
economy desiring to make a transition to a private market
economy is complex, but complexity is greater in Kosovo than in
states outside Yugoslavia. The socially owned property concept in
Kosovo (as in other states of the former Yugoslavia) introduces
uncertainties. Also, many property transfers occurred after 1989
under a series of discriminatory laws passed under the Milosevic
regime, intended to dispossess Kosovar Albanians of property.
Kosovars aggressively challenge the validity of these transfers.
Other transfers after 1989 occurred "off the books," because
Albanians were not permitted to be transferees under formal law.
Sorting all this out could take years, if not decades, and will
involve diplomacy and international politics as much as
straightforward application of legal rules to properly recorded
property claims.100
99 UNMIK Regulation 2003/13 (May 9, 2003), available at http://www.
unmikonline.org/regulations/2003/RE2003_13.pdf.
100 Another difficulty is that Kosovar Albanians usually did not formally
record property transfers during the period of Milosevic apartheid, so proving
property ownership as between Albanian claimants is difficult.
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The KTA concept appropriately separates the complexity of
property claim resolution from privatization, but the soundness of
the concept behind KTA is not enough. Many Kosovars - both
ordinary people and political leaders - mistrust KTA. Some fear
corruption. Some resent the fact that KTA's broad assertion of
control over all property, including municipally owned property
not directly associated with SOEs,10' impedes SME development
because it interferes with property transfers from municipalities, a
power critics of KTA claim to be well within the powers of local
government under the constitutional framework. There may be
merit to the idea that municipalities should be allowed greater
control over property they own, but it is difficult to separate SOE
property from purely municipal property. Some central
mechanism for sorting out the complexity was probably inevitable
to push privatization along, especially since many municipal
governments were slow to begin functioning at all.
Still others believe that KTA should obtain formal appraisals of
the value of each enterprise before soliciting bids. This idea lacks
merit because an appraised value is essentially worthless if no one
will bid that much in an open-tender process. Moreover, under
Yugoslav accounting practices, assets are not depreciated.
Therefore, the book value of every SOE is vastly inflated.
Others want to make sure that employees of the SOE control
the privatization process.10 2 That idea is also a bad one because the
employees naturally will prefer to maintain the maximum number
of jobs and require potential investors to work with an
unpredictable employee board that will discourage bids.10 3 On the
other hand, many managers and employees of SOEs have worked
hard to develop commercialization and privatization plans on their
own, often working for nothing. To remove them from the process
now will engender considerable resentment. Their lack of
101 See UNMIK Regulation 2002/12, supra note 55, § 5.5 ("[T]he administrative
authority of the Agency shall include.., all Enterprises and assets within the
scope of: ... (b) UNMIK Regulation No. 2000/45 of 11 August 2000 on Self-
Government of Municipalities in Kosovo .... ").
102 UNMIK Regulation 2003/13, supra note 99, entitles employees of an SOE to
a priority 20% of the proceeds from the sale of shares in privatization of an
enterprise. Id. § 10.
103 The Pillar IV Analysis unit concluded, with respect to commercialization,
that "wherever an elected workers' council was in place, negotiations to lease the
company were protracted and ultimately unsuccessful, with the workers
predictably reluctant to relinquish control over the company to an external
investor." The Ottoman Dilemma, supra note 35, at 22.
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cooperation informally may jeopardize successful privatization.
Still others want to begin the privatization process with the
worst SOEs instead of the most promising ones. That would also
be a bad idea. It is important to get the privatization process
started as quickly as possible, and the best way to do that is to
begin with the most promising enterprises. By any analysis, only
the very best SOEs stand any chance of successful privatization.
Controversy also exists over how real property associated with
the SOEs should be handled. Some legitimate fear exists that the
KTA will allow ownership in real property to be transferred to
investors who bid a low amount for an SOE, intending to shut it
down and simply to trade the real estate.104 Traditionally, in
Yugoslavia, the state retained ownership of virtually all real
property in urban and other industrialized areas. SOEs and others
have a use right upon the real property for as long as they engage
in productive economic activity. Many people think that merging
the use right into fee simple ownership and transferring that to an
investor gives the investor a windfall.
The most serious obstacle to privatization, however, is the
illogical insistence by the head of the EU Pillar IV, Nickolas
Lambsdorff, and his hand-picked Managing Director of KTA,
Marie Fucci, on uprooting the conceptually sound operational
policies of KTA and substituting a new scheme that would saddle
investors with liabilities of SOEs.
Nevertheless, the importance of KTA may lie not so much in
privatization of SOEs as in its power to clear clouds and conflicting
claims to property that can be made available for new enterprise
formation.
Recent reports by the analysis unit of the EU Pillar IV,
responsible for economic development in Kosovo, say that the
main impediment for new enterprise development is shortage of
land near decent infrastructure. Such land is locked up in the
SOEs. Privatization is necessary to unlock the land even if few
SOEs are privatized as going concerns. According to this
perspective, one of the purposes of privatization is to permit
bidders to exploit the real property regardless of what they do with
the other assets.
Privatization is necessary to remove obstacles to successful
development of new private sector institutions. In the words of the
104 Most SOEs do not have value as going concerns; instead, they have value
because they control real estate. Id.
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EU Pillar IV's Economic Analysis Unit, "[i]f economic prosperity
and job creation are critical to Kosovo's future, then the priority for
the international mission is to break up these quasi-feudal estates
[SOEs] and replace them with a fair and effective system of
property rights."10 5 The problem with the status quo is that
defunct SOEs are informally controlling property and leasing it to
those having political or personal ties with the SOE, while not
accounting for the lease revenue or paying taxes on it. This
behavior blocks access to real assets needed by investors,
undermines certainty needed to attract investment, and erodes the
tax base.
Economists and potential investors were concerned that KTA
might react to concerns over SOE real property assets by giving
investors only relatively short-term leases to the property on which
machinery, equipment, and the building stand. Commercialization
rules of KTA's predecessor, the Department of Trade and Industry,
for example, allowed leases of only five or ten years in connection
with investment incident to commercialization. A leasehold of
ninety-nine years would be more appropriate and should satisfy
the needs of legitimate new investors. 10 6 On May 9, 2003, UNMIK
promulgated Regulation 2003/13, which provides that a transfer of
an SOE-use right in the privatization process results in a ninety-
nine-year lease, thus resolving this question, at least for the time
being. 07
Available data suggests that Kosovo has been substantially
"deindustrialized" as industry built within the geographic
framework of the former Yugoslavia has collapsed. Few SOEs
have any promise of successful operation in a market economy.
08
105 Id. at 6.
106 For example, ninety-nine-year leases were common in the development of
the railroad industry in the United States.
107 See generally UNMIK Regulation 2003/13, supra note 99.
108 European Stability Initiative, Lessons Learned and Analysis Unit of the EU
Pillar of UNMIK: De-industrialisation and Its Consequences: A Kosovo Story (Mar.
2002), available at www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi documentjID 33.pdf. No more than
a few dozen of these enterprises -the vast majority in the manufacturing sector -
can make anything the rest of the world wants at prices that will cover their costs
and provide a return to investors. This ability is not an indictment of the skills or
commitment of management and workers in these enterprises. The Author of this
Article had the privilege of visiting six SOEs in late 2001 and was impressed with
the cleanliness of the facilities, the willingness of the employees to work without
pay to keep the machinery in good order, and the commitment of the managers to
develop business plans and do whatever else was necessary to interest foreign
investors. No doubt, some of these enterprises can be successfully privatized. But
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Privatization has a larger role to play in shifting the focus to
entirely new businesses to create new jobs and wealth.
9. PRIVATIZATION IS NOT ENOUGH
Only the most optimistic projections would conclude that
privatization of existing SOEs will generate enough jobs and
production to assure a bright economic future for Kosovo.
What will take up the slack? Part of the problem, and part of
the indictment of UNMIK's and the EU's stewardship on the
economic front, is that no one knows. No good assessment has
been made of the areas where Kosovars may have a comparative
advantage in regional and world trade. No assessment of
workforce skills and deficiencies has been done. Neither the
international community nor local political institutions have
produced an economic vision for the future.
The point is not to develop a central "plan" which then can be
executed by the state; the point is to have a concrete scenario or
scenarios that inform policymakers, entrepreneurs, and investors
as to where they should place their bets. It is perfectly acceptable
to have competing economic visions. It is a disappointment that
the Kosovar political process has not produced that yet. Most
Kosovar political reformers venture little beyond commitment to
independence for Kosovo.
The engine of economic growth must be the private sector,
acting through entrepreneurial energy, and investment targeted
towards new enterprises.
10. IMPROVING PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Many people identify indifference by the staff of public
administration as an important barrier to enterprise formation and
investment. 109 These are offices where business operators must get
in many cases, probably the majority, enterprises were established to serve
functions within intra-Yugoslavia trade patterns and had grossly inflated
workforces as part of the socialist tradition. Others were established simply to
artificially create jobs to quell social unrest or to discourage migration patterns not
desired by policymakers.
109 According to surveys of private business conducted by Riinvest in 2001
and December 2002, those doing business in Kosovo ranked the barriers as
including, in descending order of importance: unfair competition, lack of laws,
high taxes, access to finance, and administrative burdens. Early Warning Report,
supra note 56, para. 14. Of those surveyed, 28% considered administrative
burdens to be a "very large barrier" and a "large barrier," and 31.3% considered
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export licenses, pay taxes, and register their businesses. Some
Kosovars familiar with the business climate have said the most
important thing that could be done is to conduct effective training
in public relations and public service for the staff in public offices
in municipal and national governmental agencies. Many senior
governmental officials agree with this assessment, also noting that
low salaries impair public employee morale. On the other hand,
the Author and one of his students visited the business registration
office in July of 2003, stating that they wanted to register a
business. The Author noted they were treated courteously and
efficiently, as well as in any major American city and better than
many.
In addition to improving the attitudes of those who serve the
public and the business community, comprehensive attention
should be given to the regulatory environment for private business
and to the urgent need for greater governmental transparency at
all levels of government, especially at the UNMIK level.
10.1. Regulatory Review
Kosovo now has much of the traditional regulatory apparatus
for financial institutions or capital markets. It has a board that can
set accounting standards, which can be reinforced by legal
obligations to report fully and accurately when one issues
securities. It has the beginnings of a regulatory regime to regulate
financial intermediaries and capital markets through its banking
regulation and Banking and Payments Authority. The banking
regulations channel the activities of key financial institutions:
banks. Kosovo has addressed the operation of foreign entities in
domestic markets through the foreign investment regulation,
assuring them of non-discrimination. It has also provided for a
central monetary authority. Kosovo has a real property registry,
and "lenders are successfully pursuing claims in court that are
secured by real property." 110
Now, the tariff law needs to be re-evaluated and mechanisms
for capital aggregation and other financial intermediation outside
the banking and public sectors should be established. The KTA
privatization fund should be invested, at least to some extent, in
local SMEs. An investment fund may help make that possible by
them to be a "medium intensity barrier." Id. para. 15.
110 Id. para. 15(iv).
2952004]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
diversifying risk for KTA, and consideration should be given to
amendments to the banking regulation that would keep more
depositor capital inside Kosovo. Attention should be given to
imperfections in the process of executing judgments of the
Commercial Court- imperfections which impair the value of
collateral for lenders.
Finally, a regulation should be drafted and promulgated to
accommodate small investment funds resembling venture capital
funds in the United States.
10.2. Government Transparency
Greater transparency of regulation and government
administration is an important priority. Lack of governmental
transparency makes it easier for governmental officials to act
arbitrarily and encourages corruption in the form of bribes for
favorable treatment.
An essential attribute of the rule of law is being able to find out
what the law is. When the law is secret, known only to a
privileged few, entrepreneurs cannot conform their plans to legal
requirements and, therefore, must give up their plans for running a
business or take their chances on violating the law. Such a
situation breeds economic passivity and indifference to the law.
Part of any system of rule of law should include a freedom of
information act requiring every governmental authority to publish
documents that express rules imposing duties on the populace and
orders representing decisions in contested cases. In addition, such
an act should entitle any person to make copies of other records,
subject only to specific and narrow exemptions. These obligations
should be enforceable in a court or other independent tribunal and
should be supported by penalties against the agency and particular
personnel, including penalties imposed through the personnel
system of the agency.
The publication requirement should allow its duties to be
satisfied either by ink-on-paper or electronic publishing. Ink-on-
paper is often thought to be preferable to electronic publishing in a
country in transition such as Kosovo, but, in fact, that usually is not
the case. Ink-on-paper publishing involves delays associated with
preparing camera-ready copy and the printing, binding, and
distribution stages. Unless the society has a well-developed and
reliable postal system, ink-on-paper publishing is unlikely to
communicate broadly the existence or contents of a new legislative
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or agency act.
Electronic publishing through the internet, on the other hand,
happens immediately, as soon as the decision is made and a word
processing document containing the legal text can be posted on a
website. Space on a server to maintain the website need not cost
more than a few hundred euros per year for the entire Kosovar
government and UNMIK.
Internet penetration into homes and offices in Kosovo is low,
but increasing. For those people who do not have their own points
of access at home or in their offices, there is ready access to
hundreds of internet cafes scattered all over Kosovo. It is as easy
in an internet caf6 to download and print new items of interest
from an official electronic gazette as it is to go to a ministry and
look at an official bulletin board.
Kosovo has a long way to go to establish real transparency, but
not because the process is costly. For the first three years of its
existence, UNMIK regularly and promptly published new
regulations on its website in full text. 1 ' From January 2003 to June
1, 2003, however, UNMIK published nothing on the regulation
section of its website, notwithstanding the fact that a very
significant property regulation was issued in late April. There is
no excuse for this. UNMIK should be an exemplar of the rule of
law; while this may be difficult with respect to certain
controversial issues relating to competence or tax policy, it is not
difficult with respect to publishing its regulations. UNMIK should
keep the regulations section of its website up-to-date.
Almost none of the provisional government institutions have
websites. This glaring impediment should be corrected forthwith.
It is important to understand that the internet permits
decentralized publishing, agency by agency. It is better to have
some governmental transparency than none at all, while an
elaborate, centralized, official electronic gazette operation is put in
place. For example, KTA finally has put together a reasonably
good, basic website. It may be years before certain other ministries
and UNMIK entities organize themselves for publication of their
rules and orders on the internet. The pace of rule of law
development should not be set by the slowest.
It also is imperative to avoid the usual temptation of setting up
a state-granted monopoly for the dissemination of government
111 No electronic publishing aimed at improving governmental transparency
is worthwhile unless it publishes the full text.
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information, whether the monopolist is governmental or private.
Indeed, an appropriate freedom of information act entitles
alternative publishers of governmental information to obtain the
information so that they can compete with any de facto
monopolist.
Governmental transparency is necessary not only at the level of
the central government, but also at the level of municipal
government. This requires technical assistance, but the cost of the
effort is modest.
The Freedom of Information Law adopted by the Assembly in
the spring and summer of 2003 is well-drafted, and appropriately
addresses the benefits of electronic access. It should be approved
promptly by the SRSG, extended to UNMIK, interpreted broadly,
and enforced vigorously.
10.3. Business Advocacy
Legislative advocacy is an important feature of any liberal
democracy. As political institutions develop in Kosovo, ensuring
that narrow ethnic and extreme nationalist voices are not the only
voices heard is important.
Given the slow pace of private sector economic development in
Kosovo and the lack of governmental transparency and public
services necessary to support it, organizing effective business
advocacy is essential both to development of the private sector and
to the development of the right kind of democracy.
Trade associations, such as a chamber of commerce, a small
business association, and an association aimed at attracting foreign
investment, should develop data showing why existing policy
approaches are harmful and new proposals including the text of
regulations and statutes. These associations then should develop
relationships with politically influential persons in the parties, in
the government, and in the assembly, as well as in UNMIK, and
persuade political actors to embrace their proposals. The Kosovo
Chamber of Commerce could take on such an advocacy role, but so
far it has not done so with any vigor.
An effective business advocacy organization would consult
regularly with business constituents, listening carefully to
understand the problems they face. Such an organization would
fight for easy access to business laws and other legal systems
through some form of electronic database. It would have the
capacity to do legal analysis aimed at explaining how best the
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practices from other legal systems can be adapted to the needs of
Kosovo businesses. Its staff would possess exemplary
communication skills so they could develop materials persuading
people of the merits of the association's position. Effective
business advocacy for Kosovo must reach not only UNMIK, other
international organizations playing a governmental role, and the
indigenous institutions of provisional government; it must also
include foreign governments and NGOs capable of applying
pressure to domestic decisionmakers. Certain business advocacy
associations also may wish to become involved in channeling
campaign contributions to responsive political parties and
candidates.
11. THE WEAK "MIDDLE"
Impediments to enterprise formation in the private sector
include not only failures of vision and planning, governmental
barriers, and obstacles to property reform, but also include a
failure to take some fairly obvious and inexpensive steps to put
entrepreneurs together with business opportunities, and investors
together with entrepreneurs. The problem is in the "middle":
Kosovo needs more financial intermediaries.
A 2002 World Bank reportu 2 noted positive developments in
the creation of the Central Fiscal Authority, the Banking and
Payments Authority, and functioning tax and customs
administrations. Such institutions are necessary for economic
recovery." 3 Next, the report said, Kosovo needs to establish an
adequate business climate, concentrating on completion of a legal
and institutional framework for commerce; development of an
independent, professional, impartial, and multiethnic judiciary;
provision of significant flows of financial intermediation for viable
productive activity; and establishment of adequate systems of
business support and information." 4 "Kosovo's financial sector is
stunted by lack of confidence in banks; lack of trained, experienced
managers and supervisors; and a weak legal framework for private
business."" 5 Financial intermediaries must be able to evaluate and
price risk, allocate savings, finance investment, and enforce good
112 Transitional Support Strategy, supra note 39, at 3.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 5 (noting additionally that Kosovo should accelerate privatization).
115 DEMEKAS, supra note 58, at 17.
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accounting and management practices. 116
The institutionalists in the economic profession 1 7 give
insufficient attention to financial services intermediation. Not only
are securities-market regulators such as the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") necessary, so are institutions such
as stock exchanges that permit entrepreneurs and investors to find
each other and that provide a secondary market for securities. In
addition, institutional arrangements that Americans often take for
granted as naturally occurring in the private sector may be
essential to realize the potential for private enterprise development
and growth. A clear example is the debit and credit card system.
The inability of consumers to use, and merchants to accept, credit
and debit cards in Kosovo is a significant obstacle to growth in the
retail and service sectors. For credit card use to become pervasive,
institutions that market cards to consumers and to merchants must
first exist. Often, these are different institutions. In addition, inter-
bank clearing networks are necessary. Credit bureaus must also
exist to maintain easily accessible databases on the
creditworthiness of potential cardholders and card-accepting
merchants.
It is not likely that political trustees or local governmental
institutions should themselves establish these intermediaries as
governmental enterprises. Instead, they should understand that a
goal of economic development is the creation and management of
such institutions; in addition, political trustees must pursue legal
and macroeconomic policies to remove disincentives to
establishment of such institutions by private entrepreneurs.
Considerable progress has occurred in the banking sector. 1
18
On January 12, 2000, MEB (now "ProCredit Bank") 119 became the
first bank licensed by the Banking and Payments Authority of
Kosovo ("BPK") in post-conflict Kosovo.120 ProCredit Bank now
116 Id.
117 See supra Section 7 (discussing development theory).
118 But see Early Warning Report, supra note 56, para. 15(iv) (noting that short-
term bank loans from Kosovo banks are "usable only for cash flow and not for
manufacturing businesses and investments").
119 See ProCredit Bank website (describing the most successful bank in
Kosovo in 2001, 2002, and 2003), at http://www.procreditbank-
kos.com/dev.php?qjuha=english (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
120 See Internationale Micro Investitionen Aktiengesellschaft website
(describing the history of MEB in Kosovo), at http://www.imiag.de/projects/
countries/KOSOVO/main.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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has branches all over the country offering current account services,
check cashing, interest-earning saving accounts, time deposits,
debit cards, access to ATM machines, and domestic and
international money transfers. BPK also introduced credit cards in
February 2004.
ProCredit Bank offers easily accessible loans to small and micro
enterprises at all its branches, initially making loans in amounts of
a few hundred dollars, and now making loans of much larger
amounts up to several hundred thousand dollars. Applicants'
businesses must be within the bank's operational area, have
existed for at least one year, and generate a regular cash flow.
121
The bank also issues letters of credit and bank guarantees.
In May 2001, the U.S. Agency for International Development
("USAID") established the Kosovo Business and Finance Fund (the
"Fund") to aid SMEs in the manufacturing sector and to establish a
bank. As a result, the Fund established the American Bank in
Kosovo ("ABK"). In late 2001 or early 2002, the BPK stopped
commercial banking and sold its branches to ABK. In December
2002, the Austrian bank, Raiffeisenbank bought a 76% ownership
stake in ABK and rebranded it in May 2003.
The lending policies of ABK are typical of European banks,
making loans from 5,000 euros to 500,000 euros, with larger
amounts available on an exception basis. Loans of up to thirty-six
months at interest rates of 14-15% are available, but shorter terms
of twelve to eighteen months are more typical. Startups cannot get
financing, but if an entrepreneur can find sufficient capital to
operate for six months, his business becomes eligible for debt
financing. The bank requires security of 150-200% of the loan
value.
The bank sees two kinds of inadequate applications: Kosovars
who have grandiose plans but do not understand the limitations of
their hopes, and Kosovars returning from abroad expecting a U.S.,
German, or Swiss-level infrastructure and seeking to apply their
business experience from more developed countries.
While the banking and legal systems have progressed, there is
still a crippling shortage of intermediaries who can provide
business formation assistance, legal assistance, and accounting
services. There also is little in the way of startup capital
121 See Business Loans, Micro Enterprise Bank website (detailing the business
loan practices of MEB), at http://www.mebkosovo.com/services/loans.htmL (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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intermediation.
11.1. Getting Started
Many Kosovars have the desire and the financial wherewithal
to start a small business, but do not know where to begin. There
are few places they can go for advice on how to select the type of
business or how to start it. A grant from CARE Nederland and
Hivos started the Kosovo SME Support Center (the "Center") in
Gjakova, 122 but it now struggles to continue operations based on
fees. The Center services walk-up clients, but does not provide
assistance to the agricultural sector, the service sector, or to
startups because it does not believe they can obtain financing. The
Kosovo Business Support ("KBS")1 23 is a contract operation in
Prishtina, funded by USAID. KBS has an even more limited role,
excluding privatization, startups, services, and anything outside
the manufacturing and production sector.
The Kosovo Chamber of Commerce could perform this
function, however, its organizational efforts have been slow.
Kosovo needs the equivalent of the American Small Business
Administration, with local offices, including internet and paper
publications with such titles as, "How to Start your Own
Business."'124
11.2. Finding a Lawyer
Kosovo needs more transactional lawyers who can help small
businessmen get off to a good start. Apparently, only one or two
legal practitioners in all of Kosovo have sufficient knowledge of
both the 1989 Yugoslav law 125 and of UNMIK regulations, and the
ability to speak English or another major foreign language.
Too much emphasis on reform of legal education and the legal
profession is focused on human rights and criminal proceedings.
122 See CARE Nederland website (detailing the activities of CARE Nederland
in Kosovo), at http://www.carenederland.org/projecten/kos006.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2004).
123 See Kosovo Business Support website, (listing the mission, history, and
contact information of the Kosovo Business Support ["KBS"]), at
http://www.usaidkbs.com/default.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
124 See, e.g., United States Small Business Administration website, at
http://www.sba.gov/starting-business (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
125 This law applies in all cases except when it conflicts with international
human rights law, or when it is preempted by UNMIK regulations.
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Greater emphasis needs to be placed on commercial and business
law and lawyering. The international community funds the
Criminal Defense Resource Center to train and otherwise support
criminal defense attorneys, but there is no equivalent support for
developing transactional lawyer capability. 126
One useful addition to the "middle" would be a small business
assistance clinic operated jointly by certain local consulting firms,
drawing on support from the law and economics faculties of the
University of Prishtina, the Kosovo Chamber of Commerce, and
the Ministry of Trade and Industry. Such a clinic would permit
law and economics students, under appropriate supervision by
professors and experienced practitioners, to assist would-be
proprietors of SMEs in refining their business models, executing
marketing research, developing business plans, determining the
most important legal forum for their business, registering the
business, and writing contracts for employees, customers, and
suppliers. The clinic also would maintain close contacts with
diaspora groups and with assistance obtaining capital for startups.
11.3. Promotion and Advertising
Trade and investment promotion is anemic or altogether
lacking. The initiatives undertaken by the Kosovo Chamber of
Commerce in 1999-or at least envisioned by the Chamber in
1999-have not gone anywhere due to a lack of resources and
leadership. There are outside investors who would invest in
Kosovo if they knew about the opportunities. Kosovo
businessmen and women, and the local institutions of provisional
government, must promote investment opportunities in Kosovo to
the rest of the world. They also need to make it easy for investors
to follow up; this implies the need for someone to facilitate foreign
trade missions to Kosovo to inspect facilities and sites, explore the
capacity of the professional services sector for potential foreign
investors, conduct market research for Kosovars, and pay for legal
services.
A good example of part of what needs to be done is the work
by KTA, and by the U.S. Department of Commerce Central and
Eastern Europe Business Information Center ("CEEBIC"). KTA has
held a number of investment conferences in international financial
126 Icon-Institute, funded by the German government, is a modest exception.
It is funded for one year to support the development of lawyers and judges in the
Commercial Court. This effort, however, is still litigation-oriented.
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centers such as Frankfurt and New York. The October 2003
conference attracted more than one hundred interested parties.
The presentations were professional, complete, and persuasive.
The attendees expressed concern, however, about the freeze on the
third round of privatization, which had been announced by the
Deputy SRSG just days before the conference. To say the least, the
timing of the freeze was poor.
CEEBIC has a website that offers basic information on
privatization in Kosovo.127 It has a basic explanation of how
privatization works and provides basic information about eight
SOEs including a winery in Prizren, a radiator and air-conditioning
equipment manufacturer in Gjilane, a printing enterprise in
Mitrovica, a paint factory in Vushtrri, a shock absorber factory near
Prishtina, a health spa and water bottling plant in Gjilane, Hotel
Theranda in Prizren, and a fish farm and motel in Peja. Comparing
the CEEBIC website with the EU's Pillar IV website128 exposes the
shortcomings of the EU's effort to assist economic development in
the SME sector. To its credit, Pillar IV has contracted with the
European Stability Initiative 129 to operate the "Lessons Learned
and Analysis Unit of the EU Pillar of UNMIK" ("LLA"). LLA has
prepared and published a number of excellent reports on the
challenges involved in developing a viable market economy in
Kosovo.
As late as February 2003, the KTA did not have its own
website. Now it does.130  The website explains methods for
privatization of SOEs contemplated by KTA, and has basic
information about the five sectors: agribusiness, construction,
hotels and tourism, mining and metals, and other industries. Links
are provided to Adobe Acrobat fact sheets about major SOEs. This
website is a step forward.
127 Central and Eastern Europe Business Information Center, Privatization
Programs in Kosovo, at http://www.mac.doc.gov/ceebic/tlkosovo.htm (last visited
Feb. 25, 2004).
128 European Union Commitment to Kosovo website, at http://
www.euinkosovo.org (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). As late as June 1, 2003, the EU
website was "under construction" and had nothing whatsoever about
privatization or small business investment opportunities-not even a link to the
KTA website.
129 See generally European Stability Initiative website, at http://www.esiweb.
org (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
130 See generally Kosovo Trust Agency website, at http://www.kta-
kosovo.org (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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Overlapping with investment promotion, public and private
institutions must promote the products of new enterprises in
foreign markets. This also could be the job of the Kosovar
Chamber of Commerce, if it will step up to it. If it will not step up
to it, then others in the private sector in Kosovo, in the local
government institutions, and in the diaspora need to do this.
11.4. Investment Fund
It is time to consider starting one or more investment funds to
aggregate capital and permit risk management, thereby enhancing
capital available to SMEs. Already, some observers believe that
Kosovo pension assets would be more available to Kosovar
businesses if such a fund existed. Presently, prudent pension fund
management cannot invest in new SMEs or in privatized SOEs
because the risk is too great. An investment fund, on the other
hand, would manage risk through diversification and the pension
fund managers might be able to invest in the investment fund.
An investment fund would perform three important economic
functions:'31 providing maturity intermediation; reducing risk
through diversification; and reducing the costs of searching,
contracting, and information processing associated with finding
attractive investments, negotiating appropriate relationships, and
monitoring management. 132
Historically, U.S. investors were little interested in equity
investments in foreign enterprises, but this has changed as these
investors seek higher rates of return and risk-reducing
diversification. 33 The foreign investment originally focused on
shares of companies in developed countries, but has begun to shift
to include developing country markets. 34 The biggest deterrents
for investment in developing country markets are insufficient
131 The fourth economic function traditionally associated with financial
intermediation, providing a payments mechanism, is more appropriately
associated with banks than investment funds.
132 See generally FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCIAL MARKETS
AND INSTITUTIONS 21 (1994) (enumerating the functions of financial intermediaries,
including investment funds).
133 See Christopher J. Mailander, Searching for Liquidity: United States Exit
Strategies for International Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 71, 73-74
(1997) (discussing the recent trend of U.S. investors who have seen growth in
mutual funds and pension plans).
134 See id. at 74-75 (arguing that U.S. investors are increasing investment
interest in emerging markets).
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liquidity, currency risk, lack of managerial expertise and culture,
and lack of a viable exit strategy. 35
Even if investors and managers for such a fund cannot be lined
up in the short-term, serious practical steps should be taken to
determine what additional legislation may be needed in the United
States, Kosovo, and possibly Switzerland and Germany to permit
such a fund to be set up. It also may now be possible to take the
initial administrative and legal steps to establish the fund, such as
filing a charter and drafting bylaws.
Such a fund would also permit Kosovars to pool money they
already have available in amounts of, for example, 50,000 euros so
that groups of Kosovars might be able to afford to participate in
tenders for SOEs as part of the privatization process. Providing
some kind of financial intermediation for this would reduce the
political fallout of all the SOEs being brought up by foreign
investors.
11.5. Stock and Futures Exchanges
Consideration also should be given to the establishment of a
Kosovar or Balkans stock market. Stock markets already exist in
Ljubljana, Zagreb, Skopje, and Belgrade. Kosovo would be better
served by making arrangements with these regional markets
instead of developing a stock market of its own, considering the
amount of literature on the difficulties of effective functioning of a
small stock market. Kosovo's characteristics make it a relatively
poor candidate for establishing its own stock market. Linking
Kosovo's capital formation initiatives with stock markets in other
Balkan countries, especially those of Slovenia and Croatia,
however, can be an initial step toward regional integration of
capital markets that will benefit Kosovo in the long run.
There are 150 securities exchanges in the world. 36 Several
135 See id. at 77-78 (analyzing the difficulties of investing abroad). Exit
strategies include taking the company public, making the company available for
acquisition by another company, repurchasing of shares, and secondary
purchasing of shares by a third party. Id. Offering shares in the United States is
one possible way for a foreign company to promise an exit strategy to its early
investors, but this involves compliance with stringent U.S. corporate laws. Id. at
81-82.
136 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1759 (2002) (discussing the likelihood that the number of stock
exchanges will shrink in the future).
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countries in transition137 have started stock exchanges in order to
facilitate the flow of private equity capital into local enterprises
including: Albania,138 Brazil, 139 Cambodia,
140 Hungary,141 Poland, 142
Mexico, 143 the Czech Republic,
144 Slovakia, 145 Mozambique, 146
China,147 and Thailand. 48 All of the countries of the former
Yugoslavia - Bosnia,149 Croatia, 150 Macedonia,'1
5 Montenegro,152
Serbia, 5 3 and Slovenial 4- have stock exchanges of some form.
137 Coffee estimates that twenty of the twenty-six countries in transition have
created stock markets. Id. at 1801.
138 See generally Tirana Stock Exchange website, at http://www.asc.gov.al/
tiranastock.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2004).
139 See Coffee, supra note 136, at 1808 (reviewing Brazil's experience with
listing on the New York Stock Exchange).
140 See generally Jason Gottlieb, Launching the Phnom Penh Stock Exchange:
Toward a Legal Framework for Launching a Stock Exchange in an Underdeveloped
Country, 14 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 235 (2000) (examining the possibilities and
difficulties of launching a stock exchange in a developing country).
141 See William C. Philbrick, The Paving of Wall Street in Eastern Europe:
Establishing the Legal Infrastructure for Stock Markets in the Formerly Centrally
Planned Economies, 25 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 565, 572-73 (1994) (discussing the
Budapest stock exchange).
142 See id. at 574 (noting the Warsaw stock exchange).
143 See Coffee, supra note 136, at 1810 (noting the Mexico stock exchange).
144 See Philbrick, supra note 141, at 574 (noting the Prague stock exchange).
145 See id. (noting the Bratislava stock exchange).
146 See Gottlieb, supra note 140, at 249 (discussing Mozambique's experience).
147 See id. at 246 (discussing China's experience).
148 See id. at 247 (discussing Thailand's experience).
149 The Ljubljana Stock Exchange ("LJSE") provided technical assistance in
setting up stock exchanges in Banja Luka and Sarajevo, Bosnia. See The Ljubljana
Stock Exchange Website, at http://www.ljse.si/news/e-msgOl200l.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004); see also Beth Kampshror, Sarajevo Stock Exchange Opens, S.E.
EUR. TIMEs (Apr. 15, 2002) (providing a new report on the opening of an all-
electronic Sarajevo stock exchange), available at http://www.balkantimes.com/
html2/english/020415-BETH-001.htm.
150 See About the Zagreb Stock Exchange (providing general information
about the Croatian stock exchange), at http://www.zse.hr/aboutzse.html (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004). In December, 2002, fifty-three issues were traded with a
market capitalization of HRKs 28 million (the Croatian currency unit).
151 See generally Macedonian Stock Exchange website, at http://www.mse.
org.mk (last visited Feb. 25, 2004). Twenty-two companies were listed on the
Macedonia stock exchange as of February 9, 2003.
152 See generally the Montenegro Stock Exchange website, at http://www.
montenet.org/econ/mberza.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
153 See Beogradska Berza, Belgrade Stock Exchange website, at http://www.
belex.co.yu/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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Successful stock exchanges exist in countries with three
characteristics: (1) backing from a strong government (either the
local government or another involved in local government affairs),
(2) an existing industrial base eager for capital, and (3) capital to
invest.155 It also helps to have large domestic markets, extensive
supplies of natural resources, and skilled labor forces.156 An
econometric study of primary securities markets in thirty-two
emerging economies from 1980-1995 showed that stock market
capitalization 157  and accounting standards were the most
important determinants of success.158 Another study showed that
a sustained commitment to privatization was essential to stock
market success.159 Most of the transitional stock exchanges have
154 See Ljubljanska Borza, Ljubljanska Stock Exchange, Inc. website, at
http://www.ljse.si (last visited Feb. 25, 2004). On February 9, 2003, the LJSE
listed thirty-three equity issues on the "official market," and 100 equity issues on
the "free market." Only Slovenian legal entities may become members of the LJSE
and thus become enabled to trade with securities via the LJSE order-driven
electronic trading system. In addition, the members of the LJSE may also be the
Republic of Slovenia and the Bank of Slovenia. Trading on the LJSE is performed
completely electronically via an LJSE electronic trading system, called BTS. Stock
Exchange transactions may only be conducted by the LJSE members. Stock
Exchange members may enter into BTS a market order or limit orders. Trading is
based on the automated processing of orders entered into the system. All
securities are included in the daily continuous trading at varying prices-if the
price of different orders equals, trade is automatically concluded. Part of an
electronic trading system is an automated monitoring system for unusual price
and volume movements that also enables an audit trail of all member trading
actions. The highest daily price movement allowed is 10%. Short selling is not
allowed but can be committed within settlement period (two days). Ljubljanska
Borza, Ljubljanska Stock Exchange, Inc., Trading Rules, (stating the block trading
rules) at http://www.ljse.si/StrAng/Trading/TradRule/ TradRule.htm (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004). In December 2002, the market had capitalization of 6.7
billion euros in the official market and 2.7 billion euros in the free market. Fifty
issues listed 109 securities on the official market, and 148 issues listed 156
securities on the free market. Four closed-end investment funds were listed. See
Ljubljanska Borza, Ljubljanska Stock Exchange, Inc., Daily Price List, (listing
securities on the LJSE) at http://www.ljse.si/StrAng/Trading/Menu/ tr_dpl.htm
(last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
155 Gottlieb, supra note 140, at 237 (enumerating criteria).
156 Philbrick, supra note 141, at 577 (noting the characteristics of Eastern
European countries launching successful stock markets).
157 Measured as the ratio of market capitalization to GDP.
158 See ANTHONY AYLWARD & JACK GLEN, PRIMARY SECURITIES MARKETS: CROSS
COUNTRY FINDINGS (The World Bank, Int'l Fin. Corp. Discussion Paper No. 39)
(examining aggregate primary capital market activity in a cross-section of
emerging market and developed countries).
159 Enrico C. Perotti & Luc Laeven, Confidence Building in Emerging Stock
Markets (Mar. 2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/
308 [Vol. 25:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss1/4
2004] ECONOMIC SUSTAINABILITY FOR KOSOVO 309
not been successful, in part because they undermined their
credibility by beginning with mass listings of privatized
companies, shares of which proved illiquid.
60
A 2000 study commissioned by the World Bank found that low
inflation, good shareholder protection by the legal system, and size
of institutional investor assets are important factors in determining
the success of stock exchanges in transitional economies.'61
Institutional investors comprise investment and mutual funds,
pension funds, and insurance companies.
162
In countries like Kosovo, there can be problems with both the
supply of, and demand for, capital. Supply of capital is limited by
mistrust of stock markets by domestic savers, poor protection for
shareholders, and uncertain political risk. The pension system is
just being established, 163 and the insurance system got off to a false
start. 64 There are no investment or mutual funds yet. The demand
for equity capital also may be limited. Another problem, similar to
one encountered in Cambodia, is that "most enterprises are largely
family businesses, [which] are often reluctant to hire outside
professionals and resistant to non-family equity ownership."
165
Futures exchanges also may have a role to play in reducing the
risk to agricultural producers, as the agricultural sector is
restructured and privatized. Additional information is needed on
agricultural futures in other Balkan countries.
11.6. Inattention by All Levels of Government
The most important shortcoming in the economic sphere is the
conferences/financial-globalization/confidence.pdf.
160 See Coffee, supra note 135, at 1801 (noting that the Prague Stock Exchange
still has not experienced a single initial public offering).
161 See STIJN CLAESSENS ET AL., CORPORATE RISK AROUND THE WORLD 11 (2000)
(studying the risk characteristics of corporate sectors in the world), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/docs/1024.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
162 See id. at 10 (exploring the differences in risk-sharing mechanisms). The
recent development of funded pension systems makes this type of institutional
investor relatively unimportant. The same is true of insurance enterprises. The
most important type of institutional investor is the investment and mutual fund
categories, usually related to privatization. Id.
163 DEMEKAS, supra note 58, at 17-18 (discussing the possible supervision of
the pension system by the Banking and Payments Authority ("BPK")).
164 Id. at 12, 18 (describing developments in the insurance sector which began
with some DM 67 million in premium income accompanied by suspected
corruption).
165 Gottlieb, supra note 140, at 259 (describing Cambodia).
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lack of attention given to economic development by international
organizations and the provisional institutions of government. Not
much can be done about the fact that Pillar IV operated for months
with only one economist assigned to it. Something can be done,
however, about the roadblocks thrown in the road of privatization,
following a very promising start by new EU personnel -beginning
with a freeze in October 2003 and followed by an effort to
substitute illogical operational policies that would not allow
investors to obtain clear title to assets.
Moreover, the provisional government-the parliament, the
ministries, and the Kosovar political parties -can be more active in
articulating a concrete, specific economic program. It is
encouraging that they have taken a strong stand in opposition to
the obstructionist policies of the new Pillar IV administrator and
the new managing director of KTA.
Such a program would not only give entrepreneurs and
investors a road map, it also would be good politics. It would be
good politics domestically because it would show ordinary
Kosovars that their local political and governmental institutions
place a high priority on programs that will make a difference in
their lives.166 Furthermore, it would be good politics in the
struggle for more authority for local institutions. Advocates for a
more rapid transfer of power from UNMIK can point to specific
aspects of the economic program that cannot be moved forward in
the absence of further transfer of power. In addition, it would be
good politics with respect to final status because it similarly would
permit advocates of independence for Kosovo to point to specific
aspects of the economic program that cannot be implemented or
that are difficult to realize because of Kosovo's lack of sovereignty
and status as an independent state.
The international community must push for more energetic
development of the private sector, but economic development in
the private sector cannot happen if the locals sit back and wait for
the international community to do it. Individual Kosovars must
take the initiative to start businesses, including those professional
166 Opinion surveys show that "dissatisfaction with current political trends is
closely correlated with the dissatisfaction... with the current economic
situation." Early Warning Report, supra note 55, at 11-13. A March 2003 survey
showed that unemployment and economic development were the top priority
issues for the Kosovar population. Yet Kosovar political leaders and political
organizations "concentrate their strategy almost exclusively on the issue of the
final status of Kosovo." Id. at 13.
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services that will help other Kosovars understand how to start
their own businesses. Existing governmental and quasi-
governmental institutions, such as the Chamber, must meet their
responsibilities to provide leadership and action in the economic
sector instead of putting their energy into lobbying for a quicker
transfer of more authority and into debates about eventual
independence.
Part of the problem is that the opportunity cost is too great for
the best and brightest professionals to do these things. They
respond to the lure of good jobs with international organizations
and foreign missions. A significant part of the remaining money
available from the international community should be allocated to
transitioning these young professionals into self-sustaining
activities in the private sector.
The SRSG should place greater emphasis on developing the
private sector as a prerequisite for achievement of final status.
Both inter-ethnic tolerance and a legal system that respects human
rights are important, but neither will ever exist without a
sustainable economy. Economics is important, and the trustees of
Kosovo's future should recognize that concept more than they
have so far.
12. EFFECT OF FINAL STATUS NEGOTIATIONS
The management of Kosovo's first bank assesses the
relationship between final status and economic development in the
following manner:
The unresolved status of Kosovo and the lack of a foreign
trade regime prevent companies operating in Kosovo from
exporting goods to neighboring countries, and in general
prevent the region from developing export oriented
economic activities. At the same time, foreign investors
remain reluctant to place their funds in Kosovo and to
acquire stakes in local companies.
167
Deferring final status negotiations impedes economic
development in Kosovo, although it is possible that in some forms
final status actually could discourage foreign investment more
167 MEB/PROCREDrr MANAGEMENT REPORT, supra note 64, at 13.
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than would maintaining the status quo. Deferring final status
negotiations encourages Kosovar political leaders to focus their
energies and rhetoric on statehood for Kosovo rather than on the
abundance of difficult public policy issues that need attention from
local government. The absence of final status excites not only the
attention of the general public in Kosovo more than other issues,
but also allows political candidates and elected officials to use the
absence of final status as an excuse for failing to make tough
choices with respect to matters already within the competence of
local government institutions.
The absence of a final status determination discourages
threshold inquiries by potential investors. For example, the
Author of this article approached McDonald's headquarters near
Chicago on behalf of some Kosovar would-be entrepreneurs to find
out how to apply for a franchise in Kosovo. McDonald's was not
interested because Kosovo does not show up as a country on its
lists. The relevant regional franchising authority in Vienna expects
to begin processing applications for Kosovo franchises no sooner
than 2006.
In June 2003, the Author searched for the website of
Raiffeisenbank Kosovo; however, the link was obscured because its
parent's website does not list Kosovo in its country list.
The absence of final status forecloses effective participation by
Kosovo in the EU's "Stabilization and Association process," 168
intended to stabilize the western Balkans and to open the
possibility of eventual membership in the EU.169 For example,
Kosovo was not included in the western Balkans countries signing
the small business charter, because it was not eligible to do so. 170
Its need for the Prishtina-Durres highway was largely ignored
because it was not formally a part of the strategic transportation
planning process.
168 See generally The Western Balkans and European Integration,
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament, COM(03)285 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
external-relations/see/2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
169 See INT'L CRISIS GROUP, THESSALONIKI AND AFTER III: THE EU AND SERBIA,
MONTENEGRO AND Kosovo (June 20, 2003) ("So long as Kosovo's status remains
unresolved, it cannot be covered by an SAA though the EC itself describes such an
agreement as the cornerstone of the SAp."), available at http://www.crisisweb.org
/library/documents/reportarchive/A401012_20062003.pdf.
170 See supra note 80 for a discussion of the European Charter for Small
Enterprises.
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Moreover, lawyers unfamiliar with the details of Kosovo's
evolution, but called upon by clients for advice on whether they
should invest in Kosovo, despair of figuring out applicable law in
Kosovo because of the difficulty of synthesizing pre-1989 Yugoslav
law and UNMIK regulations.
Part of the problem is lack of transparency, considered in
Section 10.2. Uncertainty regarding final status is also a major
consideration. Lawyers therefore advise their clients that the law
is too unsettled to provide for adequate investor security.
The absence of a well-developed and well-known transactional
bar in Kosovo makes this problem worse, because it is extremely
difficult for a foreign investor or their foreign lawyer to obtain
reliable information about the functions of the court system and
the ability of the legal system in Kosovo to resolve disputes
between investors and management. While resolving final status
will not necessarily improve the availability or visibility of good
Kosovar transactional lawyers or make the courts more protective
of investor security, the absence of final status encourages
foreigners to conclude that Kosovo is a lawless place that investors
should avoid.
One further advantage of final status-though not necessarily
of incomplete final status negotiations -is that it would remove the
temptation for UNMIK to interrupt dialogue between Kosovars
and those necessary to assure economic development in the
international community. For example, in April 2003, UNMIK
"punished" the Kosovar provisional government for the Kosovar
Assembly's defying UNMIK on education law. The punishment
took the form of, among other things, canceling Kosovar
attendance at meetings of the Stability Pact.
Agreement is growing in the United States and the NGO
community that final status negotiations must begin without
further delay, 171 and that they should result in independence for
171 See Hearing on The Successor States to pre-19 91 Yugoslavia: Progress and
Challenges, Testimony by Daniel Serwer, Director, Balkans Initiative and Peace
Operations, United States Institute of Peace, before the Subcommittee on
European Affairs, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June 25, 2003) (stating that
the United States needs to get ready to make a decision on final status and should
nominate an American to head UNMIK, since Europe cannot proceed alone),
available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/SerwerTestimony
030625.pdf; INT'L CRISIS GROUP, supra note 169, at 6 (stating the European Union
must address final status without delay, to reach a common understanding
among its member states, and that the United States must be involved in
determining final status).
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Kosovo.172 Indeed, many observers understood, after the bombing
campaign and Milosevic's expulsion of almost the entire Albanian
population of Kosovo, that independence was the only long-term
option- or, at least, that Kosovo could never become part of Serbia
again, no matter how great its "autonomy."173
How can one imagine that a population, half of whom were
driven out of their country in spring 1999 by the Yugoslav
authorities (and whose identity cards were destroyed
precisely to make sure that all links with the country were
thereafter severed), could one day consider themselves
'citizens' (sic) of that country and ask it for a new
passport? 174
Indeed, just before the bombing campaign started, U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, presented the Yugoslav
leadership with a choice, in the metaphor of a fork in the road:
"One road led to chaos and killing and definitely, the further
disintegration of the former Republic of Yugoslavia; [t]he other road
had possibilities .... ultimately lead[ing] to some kind of
reintegration ... "175
Having elected to travel Secretary Albright's first road, Serbia
is in a poor position to protest the further disintegration of FRY, in
the form of independence for Kosovo. In fact, the FRY no longer
172 See JANUSZ BUGAJSKI ET AL., ACHIEVING A FINAL STATUS SETTLEMENT FOR
Kosovo 4 (2003) (noting that the only viable option now on the table is statehood
for Kosovo), available at http://www.csis.org/ee/kosovo finalstatus.pdf (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004). But see INT'L CRISIS GROUP, A KoSovo ROADMAP (I):
ADDRESSING FINAL STATUS 2, n.4 (Mar. 1, 2002) [hereinafter ADDRESSING FINAL
STATUS] (quoting Belgian Foreign Minister Louis Michel after the 2001 Kosovo
elections, for the presidency of the European Union, opposing independence for
Kosovo).
173 See Chris Hedges, Kosovo's Next Masters?, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 24, 25
(May/June 1999) (stating ethnic Albanians cannot remain in Serbia after the
"horrific recent bloodshed").
174 Jacques Rupnik, The Postwar Balkans and the Kosovo Question, in CHAILLOT
PAPER 50: WHAT STATUS FOR Kosovo? 69, 82 (Institute for Security Studies, Western
European Union ed., 2001) [hereinafter WHAT STATUS FOR Kosovo?] (contending
that conditional sovereignty is the best solution, because it would renounce
border changes, maintain a measure of international control, and allow Kosovars
to participate in working out a viable regional solution).
175 Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, Press Briefing Following
Meeting with Contact Group on Kosovo, Paris, France (Feb. 14, 1999), at
http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1999/990214a.html.
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exists as a formal state, after reconfiguration of the Serbian-
Montenegrin relationship in 2002.
But others conclude: "As long as Kosovo's record on the
treatment of minorities remains so poor, as long as internal and
external security remain so problematic, there is no prospect of the
international community accepting full independence as an
option."176 The International Crisis Group proposed "conditional
independence" as a way of bridging the gap. 177 European and
American analysts ended up with roughly the same conclusion
with earlier analysis.178
A number of legal arguments support the view that
reincorporation into Serbia is not mandated by Resolution 1244.
First, the Resolution "reaffirms" the commitment of member states
to the sovereignty of the FRY, but it does not refer to the
sovereignty or territorial integrity of the FRY in its provisions
relating to negotiation of final status. FRY sovereignty is omitted
in its enumeration of principles to guide final status negotiations.
176 ADDRESSING FINAL STATUS, supra note 172, at 11.
177 Id. at 12-14 (describing and advocating conditional independence).
178 See Dana H. Allin, Unintended Consequences- Managing Kosovo
Independence, in WHAT STATUS FOR Kosovo?, supra note 174, at 7 (describing how
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization ("NATO") going to war and Serb
expulsion of nearly one million Albanians made independence for Kosovo
inevitable, and discussing that since de jure independence may have to be
delayed, conditional independence is the best immediate alternative); Franz-
Lothar Altmann, The Status of Kosovo, in WHAT STATUS FOR KOSOVO?, supra note
174, at 19 (noting that Resolution 1244's reservation of sovereignty refers to
Yugoslavia, not Serbia, and acknowledging the argument that reference to
sovereignty in Yugoslavia is limited to the duration of international trusteeship;
thus reintegration into Serbia is impossible, but status as a republic within rump
Yugoslavia, akin to Montenegro, is a possible approach); Marta Dassu, Statehood
and Sovereignty- Regional and Internal Dynamics in Kosovo's Future, in WHAT STATUS
FOR KOSOvO?, supra note 174, at 35 (arguing that "constructive ambiguity" as to
sovereignty may have to be maintained for the time being, while rejecting a return
to the 1999 status quo of Kosovo as part of Serbia, and that there is a need to speed
up the process of building self-rule in Kosovo); Tim Judah, Kosovo and its Status, in
WHAT STATUS FOR Kosovo?, supra note 174, at 55 (discussing that Serbs do not
want to keep Kosovo, but have no idea how to give it up, while Kosovar
Albanians have no institutional capacity to be independent); Dimitrios
Triantaphyllou, Kosovo Independence and Regional Stability Are Not Incompatible, in
WHAT STATUS FOR Kosovo?, supra note 174, at 99 (arguing independence should be
"on the table" in direct negotiations between Prishtina and Belgrade); Thanos
Veremis, The Ever-Changing Contours of the Kosovo Issue, in WHAT STATUS FOR
Kosovo?, supra note 174, at 85 (noting there are proposals for new international
"trusteeship" under Article 76(b) of the U.N. Charter, and that continued UNMIK
administration has had a corrosive effect on the capacity of Kosovar political
institutions).
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The most reasonable inference is that the political trusteeship of the
U.N. was obligated to respect the sovereignty of FRY, but that final
status is to be unconstrained by that consideration.
Second, the FRY no longer exists, by virtue of the renegotiated
confederation of Serbia and Montenegro. This was agreed to on
March 14, 2002, which contemplates the possible dissolution of the
new "union." 179 The agreement, however, purports to transfer any
rights under Resolution 1244 to Serbia.180
Third, even if Kosovo exists under the law of Yugoslavia,
Kosovo as an autonomous province enjoyed the same power to
secede as the Yugoslav republics enjoyed. This distinguished it
from Republika Srpska in Bosnia and the Albanian areas of
Macedonia. The institutions of Kosovo exercised this right in 1991.
Several things are clear about final status negotiations:
1. Kosovar Albanians will not accept being folded back
into Serbia; the Serbs refused to accept the Rambouillet
document, and a war intervened. Approaches to
autonomy involving continued Serbian sovereignty,
although within the scope of Rambouillet, are not useful
as templates.
2. Kosovo cannot become a state without international
recognition, and that is unlikely to occur without a U.N.
Security Council Resolution approving the outcome of
final status negotiations; Russia and France can veto
such a resolution, which means that both of those states
must first accept the outcome of the negotiations.
3. Serbia must be part of the negotiations, or Russia will
not accept the outcome.
4. Kosovars will not trust UNMIK as a convener or
179 "After a period of three years, the member-states have the right to initiate
a procedure to change the statehood status or to leave the union of states." Text of
Serbia-Montenegro agreement, Re-examination provision (Mar. 14, 2002), available
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1874523.stm.
180 "In the event that Montenegro leaves the union of states, the international
documents relating to the FRY, especially U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244,
would relate in their entirety to Serbia as successor." Id.
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mediator, and may not trust the European Union in
either role. The Serbs will not trust the United States.
The best approach is for the United States, Russia, and the
European Union, with Security Council approval, to convene an
international conference to determine final status for Kosovo. The
Kosovars should be represented directly through the Prime
Minister and leaders of the three major political parties. The SRSG
should be a full participant, but should not have veto power over
the outcome, nor be able to control the timing.
Among other alternatives, the conference should focus on the
International Crisis Group proposal for conditional
independence. 181 The conditional independence status is flexible
enough to devolve substantially greater power to the assembly of
Kosovo. It can allow Kosovo to have the status of a state in the
international community, permitting full participation in the EU
Stability Pact, and allowing it to make trade agreements and to
attract foreign investment.
Another possibility is for the UN Security Council to disband
UNMIK, and authorize the European Union to replace it with a
"European Union Trusteeship in Kosovo" ("EUTRIK"). In the
same resolution establishing EUTRIK, the Security Council would
devolve further power to local institutions, reserving, however, to
EUTRIK a final veto power and continued responsibilities in the
foreign relations and security sphere. EUTRIK would be expected
to have a very long life, gradually devolving power to Kosovar
institutions until it remained a mere figurehead, much as the
Queen of England is to Canada -possessed of considerable formal
power but not expected to exercise it. Over this period of time,
EUTRIK would represent a pathway for gradual Kosovo
integration into the European Union. It would be a backdoor into
the EU for Kosovo, an alternative to the usual accession route.
The advantages are the pathway to EU integration, and the
avoidance of ever having to say formally, "Kosovo is independent
of Serbia."
13. CONCLUSION - IN THE MEANTIME
Successful nation-building requires political trustees to
181 See generally WHAT STATUS FOR Kosovo?, supra note 174 (discussing
various possible forms of status for Kosovo).
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emphasize economic development. In Kosovo, as in Bosnia,
private sector economic development took a backseat to
humanitarian relief, human rights, and the establishment of
political institutions.
Kosovo continues to provide an interesting test to see if
political trustees can get it right, thus providing a model for other
political trusteeships.
Despite the desirability of commencing final status negotiations
forthwith,182 it is also essential to recognize that beginning
negotiations over final status is not the same thing as having final
status decided. Indeed, the existence of negotiations over final
status may produce more uncertainty, represent more of a political
distraction, and discourage foreign investment to a greater degree
than the status quo. Also, most Kosovars assume that final status
will be independence, but that is not entirely assured. It is
conceivable that the realities of negotiations, and the interacting
interests of Europeans, Russians, and the United States, distracted
by other priorities, would result in a final status other than
independence. Such an unanticipated final status would have
unpredictable effects on economic development. Moreover, even
independence will not assure sound economic policy, attract
outside investment, or ensure the kind of legal and political
stability that investors seek.
There are, however, things UNMIK could do now that would
help bridge the gap. It must place private sector economic
development at the top of its list of priorities, not at the bottom. It
must act promptly to approve economic measures passed by the
Kosovo Assembly, or give specific reasons why it withholds its
approval. It must reverse the decisions by Pillar IV administrator
Lambsdorff and KTA Managing Director Fucci to derail
privatization, and replace them, if necessary, to put privatization
back on track. It must embrace governmental transparency by
promptly publishing its own regulations and administrative orders
on its website, and by encouraging the provisional institutions of
government to establish their own websites on which they publish
the full text of enactments and major legislative and regulatory
proposals. It also must allow representatives of the provisional
institutions to participate directly in international conferences.
182 See BUGAJSKIET ET AL., supra note 172, at 4 (explaining why independence
for Kosovo is inevitable and arguing that final status negotiations should not be
delayed).
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Likewise, the provisional institutions can do much to bridge
the gap and to increase their capacity for independent
responsibility. They must place private sector economic
development at the top of their lists of priorities. The major
political parties must articulate concrete economic programs. The
Assembly must adopt, and implement an agenda for enacting
economic legislation. All levels of government must embrace an
aggressive personnel development program and commitment to
transparency, thereby reducing barriers to business formation.
Both UNMIK and the provisional institutions, aided by the
NGO community, must provide support for business support
services - services that provide assistance not only for businesses
assured of success, but also for entrepreneurial proposals with
higher levels of risk.
Everyone must recognize that refugees will not return without
economic hope; that human rights are respected most when people
have economic opportunity; that liberal democracies do not exist in
societies without well-functioning economies; and that
independence will mean little unless Kosovar institutions can give
people what they want: not only independence, but also jobs, a
way to support their families, and human dignity.
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